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This thesis is concerned with the possibilities for
cooperation in the security of greater East Asia'by the ROK
Navy and Japan's Maritime Self -Defense Force. It examines
the early histories of those navies, their traditions and
images, and the cultural antipathies and nuances which
affect aspects of cooperation.
External threats to the security of the region are
weighed, balanced against the political and economic foreign
policies of Japan and the ROK, and a strategic calculus
involving U.S. participation is carefully developed. The
ensuing impacts of cooperation on Japan, the ROK, and the
U.S. are set forth, with the likely limitations stemming
from internal political processes.
Finally, the realities of possible cooperation are
assessed, and some recommendations advanced for encouraging
and enhancing that cooperation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the Navy of the Republic of Korea
(ROK) and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)
to determine if the two navies can cooperate to enhance the
security of East Asia. This subject is particularly germane
for several reasons. First, the threat of Soviet interfer-
ence in Japan's affairs, and to a lesser extent, South
Korea's, is increasing. The Soviets attempted to drive a
wedge between Japan and the United States by deploying SS-20
medium-range missiles in Siberia, in retaliation for Japan's
plans to deploy 48 F-16 fighter-bombers at Misawa.^ The
Soviets also increased troop strength on the southern Kurile
Islands,^ continued to develop their base at Cam Rahn Bay,^
and shot down an unarmed Korean Airlines Flight 007,"* demon-
strating that they are serious about maintaining their vital
security prerogatives. Some Japanese view these Soviet
moves with concern. Others caution against over-reacting,
which could jeopardize the future of Soviet- Japanese trade.
^
Could ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation blunt this Soviet mili-
tary threat?
^Geoffrey Murray, "Tokyo Worries Soviet SS-20 's May
Swing East," Christian Science Monitor
,
21 January 1983, p.
^Geoffrey Murray, "Tokyo Finds Political Leverage With
Moscow Essential to Settle Issues," Christian Science
Monitor
, 22 April 1983, p. 7.
^Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1985 , 4th
ed. (Washington, D.C.: UTS"!^ Government Printing Office,
1985), p. 118.
* Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1984. (Tokyo:
Japan-Times, 1984), p. 111. ^
^Geoffrey Murray, "Japan Businessmen Eager to Restore
Soviet Ties, Christian Science Monitor, 8 February 1983, p.
Second, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
is an unpredictable political and military force on the
Korean peninsula. As demonstrated by the Rangoon bombing
incident which killed 17 South Korean government officials,^
sporadic border incursions into South Korean territory,' and
the ubiquitous attempts by North Korea at seaborne infiltra-
tion into the South,' the DPRK is willing to take signifi-
cant risks to achieve Korean reunification on its own terms.
The DPRK President, Kim II Sung,^ has repeatedly vowed to
reunify the Korean peninsula during his lifetime.^" Kim is
now 72 years old and with the leadership passing to his son,
Kim Chong II, will President Kim launch another war to gain
his stated objective? Could ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation
help stabilize this situation?
Third, an ever-growing U.S. trade imbalance favoring
Japan (by $37 billion) ^^ and Korea (by 3 billion) ^^ is of
rising concern to U.S. lawmakers who spent over $52
billion^' of a total $273.4 billion 1984 defense budget to
maintain security in the Far East . ^ '* (See Appendix A for a
summary of U.S. forces in that region.) Compared with
^^^^'"The New Asian Era," Wall Street Journal, 11 October
1983, p. 30.
'"What's News," Wall Street Journal
, 20 June 1983, p. 1.
'"What's News," Wall Street Journal, 5 December 198 3, p.
.
'Throughout this thesis, Korean family names willprinted first; Japanese family names will be printed last.
^"Norman Thorpe, "Activities in North Korea Give Jitters
to South Korean. American Analysts," Wall Street Journal, 2April 1982, p. 26.
^ ! Charles P. Alexander, ^ "Buy More Foreign Goods," TimeMagazine
, 22 April 1985, p. 42.
o^ ^^^^^^^X Eason, "Trading Views: Korea and the UnitedStates. Nation s Business
, December 1984, pp. 50-51.
M-i-!^"^^^ l^^^^^^t^S?f^.S??titute for Strategic Studies, They^L^tjary B^lai^ice 1984-1985
, (London: Heffers PrintingT






Japan's defense contribution of $11.6 billion^ ^ and the
Republic of Korea's $4.32 billion, ^^ the U.S. contribution
is disproportionally high. U.S. concern is mounting that
this defense contribution is unrealistic today, particularly
Japan's reluctance to spend more than one percent of its
Gross National Product (GNP) in its own defense.^' This,
coupled with a growing annual U.S. federal deficit projected
to reach $209 billion this fiscal year,^' elicits the charge
that the Japanese enjoy a "free ride," on defense, ^^ and
should spend more.^° Could ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation
enhance security, cost them little in dollar terms, and make
all parties happy?
Finally, recent overtures between Japan and South Korea,
including exchange state visits by Prime Minister Nakasone^^
and President Chun Doo Hwan,^^ have lessened animosity
between these Asian neighbors . ^ ^ Both leaders stressed good
relations and minimized points of contention during these
visits. This was highlighted by Emperor Hirohito's regret
for the sufferings inflicted on Koreans during the Japanese










^^David R. Francis, "Budget Deficits, Trade, and the
Dollar," Christian Science Monitor
,
19 February 1985, pp.
6- 7 .
^
^Walter Taylor with Hidehiro Tanakadate, "When Push
Comes to Shove with Japan," U.S. News and World Report, 27
June 1983, pp. 35-36. ^
2°T. H. Harvey, Jr., "Japan's Defense Effort," New York
Times
, 21 March 1984, p. 23.
^^Takashi Oka, "Japan's Nakasone Explores Common Ground
with Korea, ' Christian Science Monitor, 13 January 1983., p.
2
^"What's News," Wall Street Journal, 7 September 1984,
p. 1.
^^Takashi Oka, "Japanese Premier to Patch Up Korean Ti





occupation.^'* Does this wave of reconciliation signal that
the time is right for military cooperation between the two
nations?
This thesis reviews the history of the ROK Navy and
JMSDF, describes the threats to both, and evaluates
domestic, regional and international factors to "answer the
questions: Is naval cooperation possible? How would each
country benefit? When might it occur? What form might it
take? What security burdens might the ROK Navy and the
JMSDF be reasonably expected to assume from the United
States? Is cooperation in the best interest of Asia? What
problems can be expected and what can be done about them?
My thesis is that the ROK Navy and JMSDF will likely
cooperate under U.S. Navy guidance within the next decade.
This cooperation will begin slowly, yet grow significantly
through the year 2000 and beyond, easing U.S. security
responsibilities in the Far East. The U.S. will retain
overall control of this cooperation for the foreseeable
future, yet a three-way rotating command structure could
eventually replace this arrangement.
Thesis conclusions are based on studies within the
framework of today's realities. Consequently, the conclu-
sions may seem undramatic. However, they are based upon not
what could happen if all parties agreed to accept radical
change, but rather upon the assumption that all parties will
want to change the least for the greatest benefit.
2 «.,Gepffrey Murray, "North-South Rift Persists Among
iQaf^^^ ^Q -'^Pan, Christian Science Monitor , 7 September1984, p. 9.
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II. HISTORY OF THE NAVY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
A. ANCIENT HISTORY (668-1907)
The political unification of Korea took place in 668
A.D. Korea is one of the oldest nations in Asia. In East
Asia, only China is older. ^^ While the Korean nation can
claim such notable inventions as the moveable type printing
press and beautiful celadon porcelain, ^^ Korea cannot claim,
with perhaps one exception, a glorious naval history. In
1231, the Mongols launched a massive invasion from the north
and conquered the Koryo armies. The Mongols, then under
Kublai Khan, enlisted Koryo in its famed anti- Japanese expe-
ditions mustering Korean men and ships for its ill-fated
invasion attempts of 1274 and 1281. In each case, seasonal
typhoons destroyed the Koryo-Mongol fleets, giving rise to
the Japanese myth of kamikaze or "divine wind."^' In those
battles, Koreans were required to provide tremendous quanti-
ties of provisions and 900 ships. They also provided 5,000
men in 1274, and 10,000 men in 1281.^'
In 1592, with Korea as a battleground, the Japanese
fought a naval and ground battle against the Chinese and
their Korean allies. The Japanese leader Hideyoshi Toyotomi
built a massive invasion force but concentrated solely on
the amphibious and transport field. As a result, the rela-
tively unprotected units suffered serious losses at the
^^ Edwin 0. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, The History





^'Edwin 0. Reischauer, The Japanese (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 197T7, p": 3T'.




hands of Koreans, who, under the command of Admiral Yi
Sun-Sin, used very effective "tortoise ships''^ ^ against
them.
These ships, purported to have been invented by Admiral
Yi Sun-Sin, were the world's first iron-plated ships and
looked somewhat like turtles. They sported* broadside
batteries, reinforced rams, and turtleback main decks
covered with spikes. " This made them virtually impossible
for the Japanese to board. Admiral Yi ' s forces successfully
engaged the Japanese invasion force, severing its all-
important supply lines and destroying hundreds of enemy
vessels . ^
"
For his bravery and leadership, Admiral Yi became a bona
fide national hero, and posthumously received the honorary
title of Ch ' angma
,
(loyalty - chivalry.) His memory is
honored today in both the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea. ^^
Admiral Yi ' s success was a bright spot in the generally
dim history of the Korean Navy. Clark G. Reynolds sums the
general political attitude toward naval forces held by many
Koreans and Chinese of the era:
Though China... and Korea had relearned the efficacy of
naval power, they remained generally continental states
concerned with defensive postures and relying upon their
armies. They subordinated their navies therefore to the
enerals and sought to minimize exploitation by the
estern traders. ^^





^^Neena Vreeland et al.. Area Handbook for South Korea(Washington, D. C: Government Printing OffTce, 1975), p.
'^Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea (New York:Morrow, 1974), p. 134. —
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Throughout history, until the outbreak of the Korean War
in 1950, Korea had virtually no Navy. When the military
contributed, it was the Army that played the dominant role.
In 1627 and 1637, for example, the Manchus overran the
country, further depleting manpower and economic
resources.'^ With its military in shambles, the Korean Yi
dynasty became a virtual vassal of China's Ch'ing dynasty.
Unable to protect itself, Korea relied on China to provide
appropriate military responses in times of need.^"*
By the mid- 19th century, Korea feared the power and
influence of the Western world in Asia. Events which
involved westerners, or were influenced by them, became a
source of concern for Korea. The Opium War, 1839-42,
Taiping rebellion of 1850, and the opening of Japan by
Commodore Perry in 1853,^^ are examples.
Korea's answer to this potential Western influence was
xenophobic isolationism.^^ This isolation was challenged by
several countries, of which the most persistent was Japan,
which sent missions to Korea in 1868, 1869 and 1871.^^ Due,
in part, to Korea's belief that Confucian precepts dictated
that Japan should deal with China as the senior nation
rather than directly with them, these missions were met
cooly by Korean officials. After a war-like provocation in
1875 and the failure of China to come to Korea's aid, the
Japanese forced an unequal treaty on Korea in 1876. This
treaty granted Japanese nationals extra-territorial rights
and the opening of three Korean ports to Japanese trade. ^^











''Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, The Far East , 6th




Hoping to diffuse Japanese influence, China strongly
encouraged Korea to open relations with other nations.
While the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia
all officially established diplomatic relations with Korea
during this period, Japan's preeminence was not checked.
By 1894, the Tonghak rebellion demonstrated' how anti-
foreign, and ant i- government Korea had become. In February
of that year, one thousand angry farmers destroyed an irri-
gation system they had been forced to build, broke into an
armory, then seized grain from a government warehouse.-'^ The
rebellion created an unrest that both Japan and China felt
they should control. Hence, a military confrontation
between them began over the internal stability of Korea.
Japan won this confrontation handily, resulting in the 1895
Treaty of Shimonoseki . "
°
On February 10, 1904, Russia and Japan went to war over
rights in Manchuria and Korea, in what was to be a dramatic
exemplar of Japanese military power. Two days earlier,
Japanese Admiral Togu Heikachiro attacked and crippled the
Russian squadron at Port Arthur. The Japanese Army was also
effective and successfully engaged the Russians."^
The Japanese got the upper hand early in the war, which
motivated the Russians to seek peace. By the Treaty of
Portsmouth (1905), Japan received rights to occupy Korea in
return for no monetary war reparation from Russia.'*^ From
1905-1910, Korea was a Japanese protectorate: the Japanese







"; "Claude A. Buss, Asia in the Modern World (New York:Macmillan Co., 1964), p. 155.
—
"^Clyde and Beers, Far East
, pp. 250-251.




disbanded the Korean armed forces, and forced the abdication
of Emperor Kojong, of Korea, in 1907.'''* The stage was set
for the 1910 annexation of Korea by Japan. ''^
B. JAPANESE RULE (1910-1945)
From 1910 to 1945, Korea was ruled directly from Tokyo
through a governor general appointed by the Japanese
Emperor. Korea became a colony, and was therefore required
to support Japan with its agriculture, raw materials, and
industrial products. In 1937, Korea was even requested to
support its colonial ruler with manpower in the form of a
voluntary enlistment of Korean men into the Japanese armed
forces. Japan enacted this program because of its
increasing military requirements, with the advent of the
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).'*^ In 1942, this system was
changed from voluntary enlistment to conscription. One
outgrowth of this period was that those Koreans who served
in the Japanese army later became the leadership core in the
South Korean Police, Army and Navy after 1945."'
C. KOREA DIVIDED (1945-1948)
The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8,
1945. Before then the USSR and Japan had maintained a non-
belligerent relationship in accordance with the April, 1941,




"'Clyde and Beers, Far East
,
p. 261.
"^Kyung Cho Chung, Korea: The Third Republic (New York:




"^Clyde and Beers, Far East
, pp. 389, 391.
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From a U.S. perspective, the entry into the Pacific war
by the USSR seemed appropriate at the time. The United
States was concerned that the final war for control of Japan
would be very bloody, costing many American lives. It made
sense, therefore, to invite the Soviets, who could share in
the burden."^ However, requesting Soviet assistance sowed
the seeds of future long-term problems on the Korean
Peninsula.
When the Russians entered the war, the Japanese were so
weak that the Russians were. not needed.^" It would have been
better had they never been invited to participate.
Regrettably, this is Monday quarterbacking because few could
have predicted that the atom bomb would put the United
States in such a favorable position relative to Japan in the
war.
Despite the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki which brought home the reality of Japan's imminent
defeat and surrender, the Soviets claimed- -and correctly,
that they should receive compensation for their contribution
to ending the war.^* Consequently Korea was divided at the
38th parallel as a "temporary" demarcation line between the
Soviet and the U . S . -controlled portions of the country.
While this division was understood to be an interim solu-
tion, both North and South Koreas attempted to quickly soli-
dify their own positions to deal from a position of
strength. ^ ^
In the military, the North, under Communist rule,
attracted those men who had fought alongside the Soviets and











the Japanese and the Kuomintang (KMT). The Japanese and
KMT-trained soldiers fled to the South where they were
accepted, and joined the South' s Constabulary force which
became the precursor of the South Korean army . ^ ^ The battle
lines between North and South Korea were being drawn.
Following the war, both North and South Korea faced many
problems. The industrial base was primarily in the north,
while the agricultural base was located in the south. ^'' When
Japan surrendered, the booming farm export business from
South Korea to Japan decreased because the Japanese could
not afford the goods . ^ ^
This sent the South Korean economy beyond a recession,
into a tailspin. South Korea could ill-afford to pay to
train an effective military. With no effective military in
which to place Koreans who had been fighting for the last
several years , the Security Police Force became a large
repository for them.^^
General Hodge, U.S. Army Commander of the American
"occupation forces" advocated forming a bona fide Korean
military organization. The idea for the establishment of
this "Korean Military Defense Unit," as General Hodge
referred to it, met with strong opposition from both
President Truman and General MacArthur. They believed the
forming of this force would cause a negative reaction from
the Soviets whom they still considered a nominal ally. A
compromise was finally reached in 1946, and a token Reserve
Constabulary was formed to fulfill the role of the Korean











^^Chum-Kon Kim, The Korean War 1950-53 (Seoul, Korea





The Reserve Constabulary Force was a compromise of the
worst kind. Recruiting standards were low. Most sophisti-
cated military hardware was given to the Korean Security
Police rather than the Constabulary Force, limiting the
effectiveness of the Constabulary.^' While the initial group
of U.S. service men who "occupied" Korea following the war
were not bad troops, they were frequently inexperienced.
Their subsequent replacements often were problem soldiers
from the occupation troops in Japan.
In 1947, negotiations, broke down between the United
States and the Soviet Union over the resolution of the 38th
Parallel issue. Based on growing tension, the U.S. authori-
ties decided to transform the ROK Constabulary Force into an
army and expand it greatly. It increased from a force of
6,000 men in November, 1946, to 50,000 men by the summer of
1948.5'
The United States submitted the question of a divided
Korea to the General Assembly of the United Nations in
September, 1947. The General Assembly decided that free
elections were a must, and they were scheduled. The
Soviets, however, blocked the United Nations Election
Commission from entering North Korea to administer the
elections. This rendered the entire election a South-only
referendum. ^ °
On May 31, 1948 Syngman Rhee was elected Speaker of the
National Assembly in the South. After a new Constitution
was adopted, Rhee was elected President on July 20th. The
Republic of Korea was formally proclaimed August 15, 1948,
which made way for an increased ROK military buildup. ^^
/^ ^'Gregory Henderson, Korea : The Politics in the Vortex(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), ppT 343-3^4T:








, Korea: A History (Rutland, Vermont:
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The ROK Navy was created from the National Maritime
Guard, in September, 1948, and started with a few small
craft. On November 30, 1948, the Armed Forces Organization
Act created the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), comprised of
the staff Chiefs of the Army and Navy. The Marine Corps was
also founded in 1949, as an independent command.^' This gave
the Navy official status on a par with the Army.
While the manpower' strength of the ROK Army at the start
of the Armed Forces Organization Act was 67,558 troops, the
Navy had only 7,715 officers and men, which included 1,241
Marine Corps members. ^^ The Navy had only 28 small ships,
including landing craft and mine sweepers. The port facili-
ties used by the Navy included Inchon, Pusan, Mokyo Yosu and
Chinhae . The ships were spread between these ports, making
it difficult to standardize procedures, training and
materiel readiness . ^ *
D. KOREAN WAR (1950-1953)
At the outbreak of the Korean War, in June 1950, the ROK
had one major ship, a 175 foot training ship, about 30 small
coastal patrol ships and only 7500 officers and men.
Interestingly this ship, the Bak Du San, was purchased for
$18,000 by the 7,500 officers and men of the ROK Navy, and
not the government . ^ ^ While this number continued to
increase throughout the conflict, the few Republic of Korea
ships played only a supporting role in the war.^^
Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1971), p. 275.







'^Raymond V. B. Blackman, ed .
,
Jane ' s Fighting Ships
1^50-51 (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1951), p.
262
.
''Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in
21
The ROK Navy did, however, provide valuable assistance
to the U.S. Navy which bore the brunt of the fighting
responsibility. That assistance was in the form of at least
one ROK Naval officer or senior enlisted personnel assigned
to every United Nations ship involved in the Korean
conflict . ^ ^
This ROK liaison officer or petty officer was a key
ingredient in the success of the United Nations ship forces
in several key warfare assignments, including search and
seizure of small DPRK craft and disruption of the fishing
industry which was crucial to the survival of the North.
The superb work of these ROK liaison personnel is high-
lighted by the comments of Commander James A. Dare,
Commanding Officer of one of the most successful ships
during the Korean conflict, the USS Douglas H. Fox (DD-779).
While discussing his ship's extraordinary success in the
search, seizure and destruction of the DPRK's fishing
vessels, he said:
The ROK naval officer, Ensign Un Soo Koo, was a bright,
extrovert type. On many occasions he managed to get
information from the captured prisoners in about 30
seconds, which was then transmitted to the ship by
radio. One time, he convinced two prisoners, caught 30
minutes earlier, to help spot gunfire on the loading
piers and warehouses behind Mayang-do. (I am not
certain the prisoners weren't spotting our fire onto
their creditors homes .) ^
^
At war's end, the ROK Navy had lost one ship like the
Bak Du San; two minesweepers, including a third damaged
beyond repair; one Auxiliary minelayer; and one motor
torpedo boat, all to enemy mines . ^
^




^'Quoted in Cagle and Manson, Sea War, p. 345.
iQco^c?^y?°^4 ^- ?• Blackman, ed . Jane's Fight ing Ship s1953-54 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co
.
, 1953), p . 252.
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The Korean conflict conclusively demonstrated that the
dominant sea power in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea
possesses a significant advantage in any conflict on the
Korean Peninsula. United Nations forces during the Korean
War, including ships from Canada, the United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the United
States, neutralized any sea borne threat from the DPRK . As
the authors of The Sea War in Korea conclude vis-a-vis that
assurance of control:
Without command of the seas between the Free World and
Korea, and in the waters adjacent to that beleaguered
peninsula, the Korean War, as fought, most cerrainly
would have been lost both militarily and politically
with a finality that would now be plain to every
American. Operations by ground and air forces were
completely dependent on a steady flow of personnel and
supplies, the bulk of which came across the vast Pacific
ocean. This conclusion is substantiated by these
factors
:
1. Six of every seven people who went to Korea went
by sea.
2. Fifty-four million tons of dry cargo, 22 million
tons of petroleum products went to Korea by ship.
3. Every soldier landed in Korea was accompanied by
five tons of equipment, and it took 54 pounds
every day to keep him there.
4. For every ton of trans-Pacific air freight, there
were 270 tons of trans-Pacific sea freight. For
every ton of air freight, four tons or gasoline
for the airplanes had to be delivered across the
Pacific by ship.^°
E. ROK NAVY (1953-1970S)
The United Nations Command signed the Armistice
Agreement with Communist forces on July 27, 1953. After
thirty seven months and two days of fighting, that cost the
United States alone 142,091 casualties and almost twenty
'"Cagle and Manson, Sea War, pp. 491-92
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billion dollars. ^^ Immediately after the signing of the
Armistice, the ROK Navy took over operational authority from
the United Nations command and assumed the coastal defense
responsibility of the Republic. ^^
Since that time, the ROK Navy has strengthened its
combat capabilities and tonnage by acquiring mostly former
U.S. Navy equipment, and adopting U.S. Navy training. Major
equipment acquisitions" have included escort destroyers and
larger combat destroyers in the 1960 's^^ a fleet of Landing
Tracked Vehicles (LVTS), helicopters and high-speed patrol
boats in the 1970 's'" and more sophisticated fire control
and missile systems in the 1980's.^^
Though small in size, the ROK Navy is an important link
in the security of South Korea. This is a contrast to the
Japanese, who question not only the value of their Maritime
Self-Defense Force, but also the very legality of its exis-
tence.^^ To understand this comparison between the Republic
of Korea, which has not enjoyed a very distinguished naval
tradition, and the Japanese, who have long understood the
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III. JAPANESE NAVAL HISTORY
A. ANCIENT HISTORY
Japan has long enjoyed a rich heritage with the Sea.
Because of its island nation status, no traveler could enter
or leave Japan but by the sea. As early as 200 A. D. , Japan
is believed to have been overrun by "waves of . . .invaders
from the Korean Peninsula. " ^ ^ By the 6th century, there was
a heavy flow of waterborne traffic and cultural influences
into Japan from China. ^' Japan recognized early the military
value of the sea.
In 1263, Kublai Khan conquered Korea and aspired to the
conquest of Japan. '^ An attempt to conquer Japan was made in
1274, but failed because heavy weather destroyed the
conquerors.^" In 1281 A. D., the Mongols assembled the
greatest overseas expedition the world had ever seen to that
point, and sailed it into the jaws of a typhoon.'^ The
Mongols were destroyed by the typhoon which became legend
for the Japanese, and strengthened their belief that their
country was protected by divine providence.
In 1592, the Japanese attempted to turn the tables by
conquering Korea with great naval and land forces . Japan
did not succeed and finally withdrew after their great
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Shortly thereafter, Japan became fearful of spiritual,
cultural and political pollution from the outside world and
closed its doors to all foreigners in 1638.*^ To violate
this law was to die. The only important exception was the
annual Dutch trading expedition from Indonesia to the island
of Deshima.*" This ban was officially lifted after Commodore
Perry sailed into Edo Bay in 1853.
The following years saw Japan make much change in
governmental policy. ^^ A British fleet destroyed Yokohama in
1863, following the execution of an Englishman, and an
allied fleet leveled Choshu forts in 1864. Japan's leader-
ship took note . ^ ^
The ensuing years brought war with China, that ended in
the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895); war with Russia (1904-05);
and World War I (1914-1918). Each of these conflicts demon-
strated that sea power was valuable for an emerging world
power.
B. WORLD WAR II
On December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor Day, the Japanese had
a fleet second to perhaps only the United States. It was
considered the largest, and most advanced of its kind . ^ ^ By
the end of the war, Japan's Navy had suffered many losses,
but could still be considered formidable by any standard. ^^
On August 14, 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam Proclamation,
John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer and Albert M.Craig, East Asia :
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which called for the surrender and occupation of Japan. The
occupation forces led by General Douglas MacArthur were
directed by President Truman to ensure that:
...the Japanese military forces, after being completely
disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes
with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive
lives... We do not intend that the Japanese shall be
enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but sternjustice shall be meted out to all war criminals,
including those who" have visited cruelties upon our
prisoners ... Japan shall be permitted to maintain such
industries as will sustain her economy and permit the
exaction of just reparations in kind, but to, as distin-
guished from control of, raw materials shall be
permitted. .. We call upon the government of Japan to
proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese
armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assur-
ances of their good faith in such action. The alterna-
tive for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.^^
From this point, the Japanese Navy was quickly disman-
tled. The largest ships, including seven carriers, three
battleships, twelve cruisers and three auxiliaries were
scrapped or sunk. Some 135 other ships and small craft were
given away to Allied Navies and the Merchant Marines.^" The
only area of Japan's once mighty fleet that remained with
sufficient numbers to be considered a force, was mine-




Japanese Constitution, drafted by General
MacArthur' s own staff after the General rejected the initial
Japanese proposals, was the foundation for preventing Japan
from significantly contributing to its own defense. Article
^
^ The Potsdam Proclamation
,
quoted in Ruhl J. Bartlett,
ed
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IX, entitled, "The Renunciation of War," renounced forever
the ability to engage in war and the maintenance of "land,
sea, and air forces as well as other war potential ." ^
^
The predicable outcome of this Constitution was a Japan
that no longer had to be concerned with self-defense. Other
factors did push the Japanese into maintenance of at least a
small coastal naval force. Two of these factors, smuggling
and illegal immigration, required the Japanese to develop a
coastal patrol force that could protect the homeland. This
force was small (28 former Japanese submarine chasers), and
underpowered, to the extent that they were frequently outrun
and outgunned by the smugglers they were supposed to be
controlling. ^ ^
C. THE KOREAN WAR PERIOD
The Korean War of June 25, 1950, caused a major
re-evaluation in the U.S. -backed, Japanese-supported disar-
mament policy of the post-war years. Japan's minesweeping
fleet was enlisted to clear mined areas off of Korea. The
Japanese did this with great professionalism, losing only
two of 46 minesweepers and one Japanese life.^^
More far-reaching was the U.S. administration's under-
standing that a defenseless Japan left a dangerous void in
the security of the entire Pacific. After General
MacArthur was required to remove most of the occupation
force from Japan to fight in the Korean conflict, he
required then Prime Minister Yoshida to establish a 75,000
man National Police Reserve. Yoshida thought this force was
merely to maintain Japanese internal security, however,











maintained that a mutual defense agreement between Japan and
the U.S. could only be possible if Japan rearmed to assume
primary responsibility for defense against a Soviet attack,
and assist in regional security matters. He defined this as
a 350,000-man military force. ^^
Prime Minister Yoshida refused to comply with Dulles'
plan. This disagreement resulted in the 1951 U.S. -Japan
Mutual Security Act. 'This Act permitted the stationing of
U.S. forces in Japan, thus providing for the establishment
of stop-gap security based on U.S. forces . ^ ^ Some 34 years
later, this stop-gap security based on U.S. forces is still
in place.
During this same period, discussions were taking place
in the U.S. to determine how we could assist the Japanese to
begin building a credible, self-defense "Navy." General
Matthew B. Ridgway, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers
(SCAP), decided that Japan would be offered a force of 68
vessels: 18 patrol frigates and 50 large support/ landing
ships. The patrol' frigates were those returned to the U.S.
by the Soviet Union following the war and were located in
Yokosuka harbor, while the 50 landing craft were in the U.S.
Prime Minister Yoshida accepted this offer. ^^ Thus, the
restoration of the Japanese Navy began.
Although not in agreement with all Secretary Dulles
demanded from Japan in a mutual security treaty arrangement
,
Prime Minister Yoshida recognized Japan would have to
contribute more to its own defense. Therefore, in the
spring of 1952, he reorganized the National Police Reserve
^ James H. Buck, ed. , The Modern Japanese Military
System (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications" 19 75),
p"^ 43T







and expanded its membership. Renamed the National Safety
Agency, it was comprised of two military arms: the National
Safety Force, and the Maritime Safety Board.
D. THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT
In March, 1954, after long discussion, the Yoshida
government concluded the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
with the United States. This agreement provided a legal
basis for furnishing U.S. equipment to support Japanese
requirements under the 1951 Mutual Security Act and was
landmark in U.S. -Japan security relations, because it




(Japan is required) to fulfill the military obliga-
tions ... assumed under the Security Treaty ... (and to)
make 5 consistent with the political and economic
stability of Japan, the full contribution permitted by
its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic
condition of the development and maintenance of its own
defensive strength and the defensive strength of the
free world. ^ ^
The latitude to escape this responsibility was provided for
in that same agreement
.
In the planning of a defense assistance program for
Japan, economic stability will be an essential element
for consideration in the development of its defense
capacities, and that Japan can contribute only to the
extent permitted by its general economic condition and
capacities
.
While the U.S. -Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
was negotiated, efforts were made to revitalize the Japanese
Navy. Under the agreement, a loan of fifteen ships was
9 7
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negotiated. The Japanese received eight destroyers, one
submarine, four tank- landing ships, numerous minesweepers
and other vessels from the United States. Though these
ships were loaned, the U.S. amended the loans to make them
"grant aid," so the Japanese could keep the ships .'
^
A problem still had to be overcome before the'Navy could
achieve legitimacy. The Japanese Constitution's Article IX
did not permit Japan 'to have a military force. Yet the
U.S. -Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement called for
Japan to defend itself commensurate with its financial
ability to support that defense. This contradiction was
solved by Prime Minister Yoshida in the summer of 1954,
when, after a long and acrimonious fight in the Diet, he won
support for the Defence Agency Establishment Law and the
Self-Defense Forces Law. This law created the Japanese
Defense Agency ( JDA) , the Maritime Self -Defense Force
(MSDF), and redefined the Maritime Safety Board (later the
Maritime Safety Agency (MSA)) to become like the U.S. Coast
Guard. '°°
E. THE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
From 1954 to 1956, the newly formed MSDF attempted to
consolidate their forces and improve their capabilities. By
late 1956, the MSDF was comprised of 28 destroyers, one
submarine, 49 mine warfare craft, and various other
craf t . "^ ° ^ The Maritime Safety Board also expanded and armed
46 small patrol vessels and acquired seven large vessels














A shortcoming during this period was the lack of any
specified mission for the MSDF . This problem was addressed
with the founding of the National Defense Council in 1956.
By May, 1957, the recommendations submitted by the Council
were approved by the Cabinet. The basic policy was defined
as follows:
The objective of national defense is to prevent direct
and indirect aggression, but .once invaded, to repel such
aggression, thereby preserving the independence and
"ounded upon democratic principles . ^ ° ^peace of Japan f(
Whi-le this did not include specific tasking, it did delin-
eate general guidelines under which the MSDF could operate.
In another attempt to define the direction of the MSDF,
the National Defense Council prepared a five-year defense
plan for the years 1956 - 1960, which called for a fleet of
211 ships. Shortly after, a building program was approved
to support this plan. The decision was made to build
Japanese ships, when possible, rather than purchase
U.S. -built models. However, U.S. designs and U.S. topside
weapons were frequently used in those early years . ^ ° "*
By 1960, the MSDF had 57 major surface combatants, two
submarines, and 142 other ships. The Maritime Safety Agency
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F. THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY
1960 was an important year in the development of the
MSDF because of the ratification of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the U.S. This
treaty was a landmark in Japan-U.S. relations, for it
signalled the character of the relationship that would exist
in U.S. -Japan defense relationships for years to come. In
Articles V and VI, the treaty established the U.S. as the
military defender of Japan as a matter of joint U.S. -Japan
interest. Further, the treaty granted U.S. military basing
rig'hts in Japanese territory . ^ ° ^
Article V also implied mutuality in defense matters by
stating that defensive action would be taken in the event of
"an armed attack against either Party." Yet a closer exami-
nation reveals the phrase "in the territories under the
administration of Japan. "^°^ Therein lay the rub. The U.S.
was fully committed to the defense of Japan, as was Japan,
itself. In this treaty, no one was committed to the defense
or security of the U.S. The treaty more accurately should
have been called the U.S. -Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
for the Security of Japan, rather than the U.S. -Japan Treaty
of Mutual Security.
This treaty was recognized as an exceptionally favorable
arrangement for Japan by Nobusuke Kishi , then Prime Minister
of Japan. He felt so strongly about it, that he rammed it
through the governmental approval process with an early
morning vote when his opponents were not on the floor of the
House of Representatives. Though the Treaty was approved,
Prime Minister Kishi was vilified for his tactless style.
In 1960, huge demonstrations protested the Treaty and
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Kishi's tactics and personal style. Due to the uproar
surrounding the Treaty, Prime Minister Kishi was forced to
leave office in July, 1960.'°'
It is curious that the treaty for which Prime Minister
Kishi was vilified, actually ensured Japan's opportunity for
economic success. By placing the lion's share of security
burden on the backs of the Americans, Japan could concern
itself with making money rather than making weapons. This
they did with great enthusiasm.




IV. THE THREAT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the
Republic of Korea's most fearsome enemy, and with good
reason. See Appendix B for a summary of North Korean
forces. With a total of 784,500 million armed forces, the
DPRK has the third largest military in the Far East, behind
only the People's Republic of China and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam. ^"^ With a population of 41.6 million,
South Korea is over twice the size of North Korea, (popula-
tion: 19.6 million). Yet it is the North that maintains
over 160,000 more active military personnel than the
South. ^^° More significantly, the North has demonstrated the
will to use that military to achieve their objectives. The
Korean war, the Panmunjom axe murders, the seizing of the
USS Pueblo and crew, and the Rangoon bombing are but a few
examples that illustrate this.
By using a combination of Soviet and PRC backing, the
North has been able to amass an impressive arsenal of equip-
ment. When compared with the South, the North has some
distinctive advantages. For example, with a 25 percent
overall larger ground force, significant advantage in
armored forces (2.1:1 in medium tanks, and 1.8:1 in armored
personnel carriers), overwhelming superiority in rocket
launchers (leading by over 2,000) and huge amounts of pre-
positioned war stocks, the North Korean Army has a larger,
very capable ground force.^^^ Its forces are highly moti-
vated, well- trained and -equipped, and have more capability
^"^Japan Defense Agency, Defense
,
p. 29.





in chemical and biological warfare than do the ROK
forces . ^ ^ ^
However, the two greatest advantages enjoyed by the
North have nothing to do with equipment or manpower at all.
They are the element of surprise, and the short distance of
only forty kilometers from the Demilitarized Zone to Seoul.
The ability to pick the time and place of an invasion is
a crucial issue. This advantage, coupled with Seoul's vuln-
erable geographic position, has guided the North to
configure its forces for offensive operations. Highly
mobile armed forces, supported by airborne elements make
North Korea's forces more threatening. As Richard Sneider
aptly states:
The South, on the other hand, is unable to trade
distance for stronger defensive positions; it must
defend all the major corridors of attack very close to
the DMZ , which requires it to spread its defensive
forces. The North's emphasis on airborne operations and
tunnel-digging is apparently designed to strengthen its
capabilities for a surprise attack that would neutralize
the DMZ defenses of the South. ^ ^
^
The North Korean Air Force has the upper hand in quan-
tity (1.7:1), yet this is an empty fact when the capabili-
ties of individual pilots and aircraft are compared. The
North Korean Air Force is comprised predominantly of MIG-
15/-17/-19 aircraft of 1950's and 1960's vintage.''" While
they do have over 150 MIG-21's (1960's technology), this
aircraft proved no match for the United States' F-4 series
during confrontations in Vietnam. The North does have the
1 1 2
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advantages of surprise and short distance to Seoul, more
significant in air warfare than in ground attack.
The South definitely has superior quality hardware and
training on their side. The F-4 is the only truly "all
weather" fighter on the Korean peninsula (excluding the
in-country U.S. operated F-16).^^^ The F-5 E/F, which the
South has in great number, can fly rings around any aircraft
the North possesses . ^ ^ ^ United States-directed training of
South Korean pilots, has made them the best in the region.
The South can rely on the- accuracy of precision-directed
munitions, and the all-hemisphere air-to-air missiles to
neutralize Northern targets. This affords greater
percentage of success than the North, which has "iron bombs"
and less sophisticated antiair missiles. ^^'
In short, although the North possesses more aircraft and
equipment than the South, they are far less effective than
the South' s. Even when the element of surprise is added to
the equation in favor of the North, it is doubtful that the
North could ever gain air superiority over the South.
In evaluating the Navy, the North enjoys superior
numbers of Naval platforms. However, unlike the case of the
North Korean Air Force, where larger numbers of older
aircraft meant little when faced with more effective ROK Air
Force aircraft, the number of North Korean vessels must be
viewed with concern by the South. The North has little or
no long-range naval power projection capability, yet it has
an effective coastal surveillance and defense Navy. The
majority of North Korea's naval units are less than seven
^
^ Mohn W. R. Taylor, ed. Jane '
s
All the World's
Aircraft 1977-78 (New York: Jane's Yearbooks , Franklin





^ ^ Mohn W. R. Taylor, ed
.
Jane's All The World's
Aircraft 1983-84
,
(London: Jane's Pub 1 i shing~Co
.
7^:984 ) , p.
37
years old, while many in South Korea's fleet are of World
War II vintage. ^^^ The ROK Navy has larger ships, and a more
sophisticated surface-to-surface antishipping missile in the
Harpoon, yet the North has the benefit of many more
missiles, torpedoes and guns to neutralize the South' s qual-
itative advantage. The North also has 21 attack submarines,
while the South has none . ^ ^
^
Scenarios of a Northern invasion of South Korea often
find the Republic of Korea Navy playing only a limited role,
including antishipping operations, special forces insertion,
naval gunfire for support, and protection of the homeland.
Within the confines of these limited Northern goals, there
is evidence that the North's superior numbers could/would
overcome the South' s qualitative advantage and thus be
successful in achieving its goals.
T, . i Thomas B. Hayward, "The Military Balance in thePacific-Asian Region, paper presented at the Sixth
ncci^^o4"^S^^^?^T^°^^??t^^^ on Contemporary Asia, Alma-Ata,USSR, 27 May-1 June 1984, p. 13.
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V . THE SOVIET THREAT
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) has
demonstrated that it intends to be recognized cls a great
world power. See Appendix C for a summary of Soviet forces
in the Far East. Since the early 1970' s, the Soviet Navy
has played an important role in this emergence. USSR ships
have become larger, and their technology more sophisti-
cated.^^" Once considered a coastal Navy with little sea
power projection capability, the Soviet Navy has grown into
the world's second most powerful navy, inferior only to the
United States . ^ ^ ^
The Soviets have used their Navy to further their
national aspirations. The U.S. Department of Defense
correctly asserts: "The Navy's power mobility and capa-
bility for worldwide deployment give it the ability to
support Soviet state interests abroad to a degree unmatched
by other brances of Soviet military ." ^ ^ ^ This policy is
nothing new or unique to the Soviets. Great Britain and the
United States used naval power to promote their foreign
policy goals long before the Soviets decided to. The Soviet
Union did learn from history that a true world power must
also have sea power projection capability. The Soviets now
have such a capability.
Nowhere is this more observable than in the Pacific.
The Soviet Pacific fleet is the largest of its four fleets,
with 88 principle surface combatants, including 2
Minsk-class aircraft carriers, 31 ballistic missile
^ ^
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submarines, 102 non-ballistic missile submarines, 220 minor
combatants, 18 amphibious ships, 84 major auxiliary support
ships, and 340 combat aircraft, including bombers . ^ ^
^
Complementing this impressive naval power is a land army 53
divisions strong, with 14,900 tanks, a tactical air force of
1,690 aircraft, and 135 new SS-20 medium-range nuclear
missiles ^^'^ stationed on the Chinese border. Two additional
light divisions of troops are located on the island of
Sakhalin. ^^^ To round out this impressive array of forces,
the USSR has Naval Facilities located in Vladivostok,
Petropavlovsk, Sovyetshoya Gavan, and access rights in
Vietnam (Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay), South Yemen (Aden,
Socotra) and Ethiopia (Dahlak Island). ^^^
Of particular concern is the base at Cam Ranh Bay. From
this location the Soviets can project huge military might
with TU-16 Badger bombers and 20-25 surface ships . ^ ^ ' In the
Fall of 1983, ships from this base and other Soviet bases
around the globe participated in the first Soviet world-wide
naval exercise since 1975. This exercise was comprehensive
in scope, and included a focus on disruption of sea-lanes of
communication and convoy operations in the South China Sea.
The exercise demonstrated the Soviets' capability to project
world-wide power and to disrupt the flow of shipping through
^ ^
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the South China Sea..^^' Even a minor disruption, with atten-
dant increase in insurance rates and slow-down of shipping
would be expensive to Japan and South Korea, which depend on
freedom of the seas for financial livelihood.
The Soviets are not satisfied with their impressive
array of forces and continue to improve and expand them.
They are currently producing or testing nine different
classes of submarines. Of these, all but one is nuclear
powered. ^^^ Construction has started on a new Soviet 65,000
ton aircraft carrier, due out by the early 1990' s, that will
operate a new generation of high performance combat
aircraf t . ^ ^ ° They already operate the world's largest air
cushion vehicle, which has the speed and maneuverability to
greatly enhance amphibious forces capability . ^ ^
^
Why this significant effort to improve an already
impressive capability? One possible answer is that the
Soviets believe the Far East holds the key to the future.
If trade with the United States is a yardstick that the
Soviets use to measure importance, then the Far East is the
most important area of the world. Asian trade today
accounts for about 30 percent of all U.S. foreign trade.
Trade with our largest partner in the region, Japan, exceeds
U.S. trade with the United Kingdom, West Germany and France,
combined. ^^^ This tremendous Far East trade, is almost
exclusively transported by ships. A wartime disruption of
the high seas lines of communication would have a devas-
tating effect on free trade, and on the security of the free
world.
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Does that mean that the Soviet Union must start a war in
the Far East to realize their goals? The answer is, "no."
Through gunboat diplomacy emanating from Cam Rahn Bay and
Vladovostock, ^ ^ ^ and threats of additional SS-20 missile
deployment from Moscow, ^^'' the real hope of the Soviets is
to drive a wedge between the United States and its Asian
allies. Their hope is to convince our allies that the
United States, not the Soviets, is the real threat. This is
true, they claim, because the U.S. is the provocateur that
requires the Soviets to aim. nuclear weapons at Asia. If the
U.S. was out of Asia, the Soviets could remove their defen-
sive nuclear weapons and all would be safe.^^^
The Soviets possess the capability to threaten the
economic and social security of the Far East. This capa-
bility, real today, continues to expand with further Soviet
weapons deployment
.
How well are the ROK Navy and the JMSDF equipped to
counter the DPRK and Soviet threats? To answer, we will
look at the Navy of the Republic of Korea and the JMSDF as
they are today.
^
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VI . THE NAVY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN 1985
The contemporary ROK Navy continues to be a moderate- to
small-sized Navy, with the primary objective of coastline
defense. Its equipment and training are a mixture of U.S.
Navy "hand-me-downs" ahd some modern upgrades. See Appendix
D for a summary of all Republic of Korea forces.
A. MANPOWER AND MATERIEL
The Navy is composed of 29,000 Naval personnel and
20,000 Marine Corps personnel, who are all volunteers and
must serve at least three years after enlisting. ^ ^ ^ The ROK
Navy has 19 principal combatants with 11 destroyers, and 8
frigates, all (less one frigate) former U.S. Navy World War
II vintage ships. In addition, the Navy has 10 corvettes, 9
missile-capable fast attack craft, 40+ smaller patrol craft,
8 minesweepers, 16 amphibious ships, 2 stores ships, 6 fuel
tankers, and 30 Coast Guard vessels. ^^' There is specula-
tion, yet unconfirmed, that the first Korean submarine built
in the Republic of Korea entered service in 1983.^^*
While most of the ROK Navy's equipment is older U.S.
type, the ships are in excellent material readiness condi-
tion and should give many more years of effective service.
They have been upgraded, with the addition of more modern
sensors and weapons systems as the SPS-40 long-range air
search radar. Harpoon surface to surface missile, helicopter
^ ^
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decks, and 20 mm Vulcan gattling gun close-in weapon system
(CIWS).'''
The 20mm Vulcan gattling gun CIWS is particularly impor-
tant because it improves the anti-air warfare capability of
these ships. It is a sophisticated anti-air-warfare weapon
system that can fire at 2,000 rounds per minute. With its
own radar tracking and acquisition system, the CIWS is a
self-contained unit, that can be placed on any surface plat-
form, regardless of the age of that platform. ^ ''
°
ROK Navy ships are limited in their overall warfare
capability by their age, which necessitates constant care
for satisfactory operational readiness. This limitation is
overcome in the "Ulsan class" frigate, the one non-U. S.
destroyer/ frigate that the ROK Navy owns. Built in the
Republic of Korea in 1980, the Ulsan class combines a modern
gas-turbine and diesel engineering plant, good anti-air
warfare capability with the Oto Melara rapid-fire 76 mm gun,
and eight Emerson twin 30 mm guns, excellent surface to
surface missile capability in the Exocet missile, and good
anti-submarine warfare capabilities with the medium
frequency PAS- 32 sonar, and MK-44 torpedoes. Originally,
four of these ships were scheduled to be built, but the
remaining three were cancelled due to funding constraints.
This design will likely be the basis for a ROK prototype,
scheduled for construction in the late 1980 's to replace its
fleet of aging U.S. destroyers . ^ "• ^
The air arm of the ROK Navy is dedicated almost entirely
to anti-submarine warfare. The current inventory includes
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helicopters (operated by the ROK Marine Corps),
approximately 10 utility aircraft for general purposes, and
an additional six reconditioned S-2 E/F aircraft just deliv-
ered.^"^ These antisubmarine warfare aircraft have fair- to-
good capability, but cannot be favorably compared with the
more modern U.S. Navy P-3C and the carrier-based S-3
aircraft
.
The primary mission of the ROK surface navy is to
protect against DPRK infiltration by sea. To accomplish
this, the ROK Navy has over 80 surface fast-attack or patrol
craft. This mission is difficult and requires profession-
alism and patience. Small fishing boats can easily be
confused when observed on radar. Visual identification and
search is, therefore, required to ensure these boats are not
carrying infiltrators.
Given the large numbers of DPRK submarines, aircraft,
and fast patrol boats, more traditional warfare areas of
anti-air warfare (AAW) , anti-submarine warfare (ASW) , and
anti- surface warfare (ASUW) are also important to the ROK
Navy.
In anti-air warfare (AAW), the ROK is in poor condition.
Its front-line ships, former U.S. destroyers and frigates,
have no sophisticated surface-to-air missile systems. Their
main batteries are five-inch 38 guns which are accurate for
shore bombardment, but fire too slowly for effective AAW.
The CIWS improves upon the capability, but only provides
short-range protection against enemy missiles. With no
fighter or attack aircraft in the Naval aviation arm, the
ROK Navy must depend on either the ROK Air Force or U.S.
fighter aircraft to neutralize enemy air power. ^''^ This
poses an inter-service or inter-governmental coordination





problem that could preclude accomplishment of ROK Navy AAW
priorities in a warfare environment.
In anti-submarine warfare, the ROK Navy is in better
condition. ROK destroyers and frigates carry middle
frequency range, active sonar equipment, that is best suited
to tracking quiet running diesel electric submarines. This
is appropriate, given that the DPRK has 21 diesel-electric
submarines and zero nuclear-powered submarines.^"" The ROK
Navy S-2 Tracker aircraft E/F can provide fair-to-good fixed
wing ASW localization, although better, more modern systems
exist in the P-3C and the S-S.^"^ The Alouette helicopters
provide a good launch platform for the MK-44 ASW torpedo,
yet have essentially no effective submarine localization
equipment . ^ "
^
The MK-44 homing torpedo, main battle torpedo for the
ROK Navy, is an inferior weapon compared to the U.S. Navy
MK-46 and should be immediately replaced in the ROK inven-
tory. Currently, there is no plan to do this. This is not
as serious as it may seem. Torpedo launch criteria in a
warfare situation against a diesel-electric submarine is
achieved in close quarters and at short range, at 500 - 1000
yards. In this situation, the MK-44 is a generally good
weapon with fair "kill" probability.^"^
The ROK Navy is satisfactorily armed to counter the
diesel-electric submarine threat, if units are deployed to
give the ROK Navy a two- surface ship to-one submarine
advantage. Since the DPRK has 21 submarines, to only 19
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In anti-surface ship warfare, the ROK is in good shape.
The ROK Navy destroyers and frigates definitely out -gun
their opponents in the DPRK. The five inch-38 is an excel-
lent anti-ship gun and can be relied upon to be effective in
any surface duel between the ROK and DPRK.^'*^ Additionally,
the 2 Harpoon, 9 standard missile (with no AAW capability),
and 3 Exocet- equipped ships provide an up-to-date and effec-
tive long-range anti-surface ship capability . ^ "* ^ Taken in
total, the ROK Navy can be proud of this area of warfare.
B. TRAINING AND READINESS
The calibre of officer in the ROK Navy is high. As with
the Army and the Air Force, the ROK Navy looks mainly to its
service academy to provide its career officer leadership.
Midshipmen are selected by rigorous examination from among
high school honor graduates. Upon graduation from the ROK
Naval Academy, midshipmen are awarded a Bachelor of Science
degree and a commission in the ROK Navy.
In-service education plays a large part in forming the
leadership elite in the Navy. The Naval War College
provides a ten-month curriculum that is essential for the
ROK Navy's rising stars. The Armed Forces Staff College, in
Seoul, offers a three month course given to a small, select
group of officers from the three services. Upon completion
of the course, those attending are earmarked for senior
rank. Finally, the National Defense College is the pinnacle
of the formal military instruction and prepares senior offi-
cers for the rigors of Flag and General rank.^^°
'"'Ibid.
, pp. 134-135.




The ROK Navy's enlisted personnel are all volunteers,
who sign on initially for three years. The Naval Training
Center at Chinhae administers a three month basic training
course that is effective as a military indoctrination tool.
Subsequent specialty training is received by the enlisted
personnel to further their specific shipboard systems knowl-
edge . ^ ^ ^
Discipline, pride" and hard work are required of both
sailors and officers in the ROK Navy. Their ships reflect
this hard training and are some of the cleanest I have ever
seen.^^^ Their pride and professionalism is evident and they
openly desire to emulate the U.S. Navy and learn from our
traditions
.
1 5 1 Ibid.
,
p. 359
r-r^T^ QT^4"^^°j ^?^^^.^ two Korean destroyers, the Jeon BukCDD-916) and the Kwang Ju TdD-921) in October, 1979, and
round them to be m outstanding material condition and spot-less . ^
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- VII. JAPANESE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE TODAY
Since 1960, the Japanese Maritime Self -Defense Force has
slowly expanded into a modern, albeit small Naval Force,
built to enhance the efforts of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to
ensure Japanese security. Most of the MSDF ' s 32 Destroyers,
18 Frigates, and ' 14 Patrol Submarines are relatively new,
having been built by the Japanese in the 1970 's or later. ^^^
The modernization of the MSDF has addressed areas of past
weakness in the force and improved upon them. See Appendix
E for a summary of all Japanese forces.
A. ANTI- SURFACE WARFARE
Recognizing that guns are no match for Soviet longer
range anti-ship missiles, the U.S. Harpoon missile has been
placed on two "Hatsuyuki" class Destroyers, one
Ishikari-class frigate and the newest Yuushio- class subma-
rine. Other ships are being retrofitted to enable them to
carry the Harpoon. Construction is underway of six more
Harpoon equipped Hatsuyuki- class destroyers, one more
Ishikari-class frigate and three more Yuushio-class subma-
rines.^^'' While this ASUW upgrade program is encouraging, it
is not enough to combat the USSR's 88 principal combatants
assigned to the Pacific f leet . ^ ^
^
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B. ANTI-AIR WARFARE
Anti-air warfare is an area of weakness in the Japanese
Maritime Self -Defense Force. This problem is being
addressed with the addition of the aforementioned U.S.
radar-controlled Gattling gun, the Close-in Weapons System
(CIWS), and the Sea Sparrow missile system to several
surface units. More important, because of its much longer
25 nautical mile range, is the inclusion of the U.S. SM- IMR
surface-to-air missile (SAM) in three Tachikaze-class
destroyers and one Amatsukaze destroyer . ^ ^
^
• When confronting the Soviets, an effective anti-air
warfare capability is the most important self-defense
requirement. With over 1200 anti-ship missile launchers on
board their ships , submarines and naval aircraft , ^ ^ ^ the
Soviets' most prevalent and effective weapon is the anti-
ship missile. The greatest concern of attack in time of
war, comes from the anti-ship missile, regardless of the
platform: air, surface, or subsurface that launched it.
While the JMSDF has improved its AAW capability, it is not
adequately protected to fend off a protracted Soviet anti-
ship missile attack.
C. ANTIr SUBMARINE WARFARE
The primary emphasis for the MSDF is anti-submarine
warfare (ASW)
.
The current inventory of ASW assets include
50 ships, 130 land-based patrol aircraft, 60 helicopters and
14 submarines . ^ ^ ^ The surface ships have hull sonars that
are on a par with comparable U.S. variants. The second ship









hydrophone array (TASS). The TASS gives any surface ship
tremendous additional anti-submarine warfare capability and
is definitely a step in the right direction.
In their submarines, the Japanese have 14 of the best
weapons available to counter the Soviet submarine threat.
The problem is that none of the Japanese submarines are
nuclear-, but rather diesel electric-powered. While these
submarines can be used for defense of the coastal waters and
deployed into choke points like Tsushima', Tsugaru, and the
Soya Straits, they cannot be used for anti-submarine opera-
tions in an open-ocean environment. This is important even
to a coastal navy, because it means that once fired on, the
enemy cannot be pursued into open ocean to continue the
engagement. The enemy nuclear attack submarine can then
reposition in its own good time to neutralize the
conventionally-powered diesel electric submarine.
The most limiting factor preventing the Japanese from
having a truly effective ASW force, is their lack of a
state-of-the-art homing torpedo. The MSDF still uses the
MK-44 torpedo. This weapon does not offer the guidance and
homing sophistication, nor the warhead size required to
contact and destroy Soviet nuclear-powered submarines. This
problem is being corrected by introduction of the MK-46
torpedo into the Japanese inventory. A definite step in the
right direction, the MK-46 is a vastly superior weapon.
Yet, the Japanese plan is to slowly, incrementally replace
their aging fleet of MK-44's, leaving them vulnerable in ASW
defense for years to come . ^ ^
^
^''Moore, Jane's Ships 1984-85
, pp. 282-283.
51
D. CURRENT JAPANESE MARITIME DEFENSE POLICY
Japan's appreciation for the role of the MSDF increased
in the early 1970' s. The Arab oil embargo, the Nixon policy
of a reduced U.S. military presence in the Pacific, the
Nixon "Shocks," and the revaluation of the U.S. dollar,
began to shake Japan from the deep sleep of post-war compla-
cency. Some Japanese, realized, perhaps for the first time
since World War II, that the U.S. could not be the Alpha
and Omega of maritime protection and economic stability for
Japan. ^^^ It was clear that if the U.S. had to choose
betveen its own interests and Japan's, it would choose its
own. Japan did likewise, and opposed the U.S. stand on
Israel in favor of Arab oil. What is interesting is that
Japan did not significantly increase the MSDF to compensate
for diminishing U.S. power.
Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki expanded Japan's defense to
include defense of sea-lanes to a distance of 1,000 nautical
miles during his meetings on May 7 and 8, 1981, with
President Reagan. ^^^ Little future action was taken on this
policy, because Prime Minister Suzuki was in political
trouble at home for having made this extraordinary
promise. ^^^ In March of 1982, Secretary of Defense
Weinberger reminded Suzuki of his 1,000 mile defense
^^"Nobuhiko Ushiba, Graham Allison and Thierry de
Montbrial, Why Japan Does Not Do More Globally," Christian
Science Monitor
,




"Japanese Premier Vows 'EvenGreater Efforts on Defense," New York Times, 9 May 1981, p.
,,
^
^!,^ '.'Tokyo Newspapers Greet Suzuki With Cool Response to
U.S. Trip," New York Times, 11 May, 1981, p. All.
^ %^ Richard Hal loran.^ "Weinberger Asks Japanese toRearm," New York Times, 26 March 1982, p. A3.
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promise, ^^^ which prompted the Prime Minister to propose a
joint Japanese-U. S . study of sea-lanes defense. The joint
study began meeting in March, 1983, and is yet to
conclude . ^ ® **
Prime Minister Nakasone, who took office in November,
1982, reaffirmed the commitment made by his predecessor to
defend the sea-lanes out to 1000 nautical miles. In an
interview following a January 18, 1983, meeting with
President Reagan, Nakasone stated three important defense
objectives. First, that Japan is "an unsinkable aircraft
carrier" for use against Soviet bombers. Second, that Japan
should have "complete and full control" of the straits
through the Japan islands. Third, that Japan must "secure
and maintain ocean lines of communication" to "several
hundred miles." "Our desire would be to defend the sea-
lanes between Guam and Tokyo and between the Strait of
Arisan and Osaka."^^^
Prime Minister Nakasone affirmed the principle of the
1000 mile protection zone again during meetings with
President Reagan in November, 1983. At a press conference
that followed this meeting. Prime Minister Nakasone stated,
"I wish to continue to make further efforts along the lines
of the joint communique of May, 1981."^^^
While these affirmations from the Prime Minister of
Japan, appear to convey widespread support f"*r Japan to
accept a large share of its own regional security responsi-
bilities, this appearance is a mirage. First, Prime
Minister Nakasone is the exception rather than the rule as a
Japanese Prime Minister. He is a dynamic, strong leader;
I 6 It Bouchard and Hess, "Sea-Lanes Defense," p. 90
^^
^"Because of Expansion (We Risk) Being Isolated,"
Washington Post, 19 January 1983, p. A12
.
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quite conservative, and in favor of a prudent, strong
defense. In short, he does not necessarily reflect the
views of most Japanese people. ^^'
Second, the specter of World War II still pervades
Japan. Many Japanese still fear that rearmament could bring
with it the chance for a recurrence of the events that
brought atomic destruction to the homeland. Nothing, they
feel, is worth that. Complete rearmament should, therefore,
never be considered. ^ ^
^
Third, many pragmatic Japanese recognize that they have
a "good deal" in the mutual security treaty. With the U.S.
guarantee of protection, Japan is able to meet all of her
security requirements by spending less that one percent of
Japan's Gross National Product (GNP). A better deal would
be hard to find.
^
'^
There are some faintly encouraging signs that Japan is
moving to accept a bigger share of their defense responsi-
bilities. While Prime Minister Nakasone has been criticized
in Japan for his "hawkish" stand on defense, he was
re-elected in November, of 1984, as president of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), and, therefore, by custom, as Prime
Minister.
Separately, the MSDF has been gradually increasing its
participation in RIMPAC exercises and other less-visible
U.S. -MSDF joint training endeavors . ^ ^ ° While there is still
some controversy, joint U.S.-JMSDF participation is gaining
^^
^Geoffrey Murray, Nakasone s US Visit Heightens His
Hawkish Image in Japan, Christian Science Monitor, 21
January 1983, p. 4.
^^^Clyde Haberman, "Japanese Celebrate, Sort of, a
Patriotic Day Today," New York Times
, 11 February 1984, p.
^^
^Walter Taylor with, Hidehiro Tanakadate, "When Push
Comes to Shove With Japan, U.S. News and World Report, 27
June 1983, pp. 35-36. ^
^^"Japan Defense Agency, Defense
, pp. 179-182.
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more support. These training opportunities must be
carefully chosen to ensure that the bounds of "self-defense"
are not overstepped to become "offensive." Joint protec-
tion of commercial shipping within 1000 nautical miles of
Japan is fine, but screening a U.S. carrier battle group in
the same area is perhaps not. The very fact that Japan can
engage in these RIMPAC exercises suggests a huge step






VIII. FUTURE ROK NAVY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS
The ROK Navy has authorized construction of the
following: 1 patrol submarine; 1 2000-ton Frigate, probably
similar to the existing Ulsan class; 3 1600-ton Frigates; 3
1000-ton corvettes; and 3 500-ton corvettes. These ships
will be built by Hyundai or Tacoma-Korea manufacturing
corporations, and will improve the fighting capability of
the ROK Navy . ^ ^ ^
Korea's emergence as a shipbuilding country is dramatic.
In 1974, South Korea was ranked 17th in the world in ship
building orders. By the end of 1981, it was second only to
Japan, with an installed capacity of 4 million gross tonnage
a year.^^^ With modern shipyards and dedicated shipyard
workers, whose wages are 65 percent lower than Japanese
workers', the Republic of Korea has a distinct advantage.
The ROK builds comparable ships, priced about 15 percent
lower than Japan and 20 to 35 percent lower than
Europe ' s . ^ ^ '^ With this significant ship building capacity
and highly competitive prices, the ROK could quickly
increase the size and quality of the ROK Navy.
There is, however, no indication that a dramatic
increase in the size of the ROK Navy will occur. Why is
this? For one, the most likely threat to South Korean
security comes for the North Korean Army and Air Force, not
the North Korean Navy. As discussed in Chapter 4 and
Appendix C, the North's Army and Air Force have impressive
'"'Moore, Jane's Ships 1984-85
, pp. 310-317.
y Jacqueline Reditt , "South Korea Surges Forth asShipbuilding Power, Christian Science Monitor
, 5 Aprili"o3





numbers of equipment . ^ ^ ^ If the DPRK Army and Air Force
conducted a successful surprise attack on South Korean
defenses, the results could be disastrous for the security
of the ROK. If the DPRK Navy conducted a similarly
successful attack against ROK ports, the short-term damage
would not be as grave. ROK defense spending is, therefore,
dedicated to support a significant army and air force and a
much less significant Navy.
Another issue that limits ROK defense spending on the
Navy, is the ROK Army's dominant influence within the South
Korean government. The last two Presidents of South Korea,
Park Chung Hee, and Chun Doo Hwan ascended to the Presidency
through military coups. In both cases these coups were
initiated by ROK Army officers who considered them vital to
national well-being. ^ ' ^ The Army, therefore, has a self-
imposed "savior from destruction, " ^ ^ ^ image that ensures,
among other things, that no other ROK military branch will
ever hold as much military or political clout as they.
This is not to say that in order to protect the sea-
lanes of communication vital to the economy, the ROK could
not justify enlarging their navy . ^ ^ ^ Pressure from the U.S.,
including a demand to share in sea lanes of communication
(SLOC) protection^'' to compensate for the $3 billion trade
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forces stationed in South Korea could cause the ROK to
expand their navy. In the absence of U.S. demands or other
external factors, the ROK Navy will probably remain small.
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IX. THE MSDF BUILD-UP
The 1976 National Defense Program Outline planned for
the MSDF to reach the goal of 60 ASW ships, 16 submarines, 2
minesweeping flotillas, 16 land-based ASW squadrons (10
fixed wing, 6 helicopter squadrons) and a total of 220
aircraft of all types, by an unspecified date.^'^ This
target is currently 10 ASW ships, 2 submarines and 30
aircraft short of the mark. ^ *
^
The 1982 Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate, the "56
Chugyo , " covering the years 1983-1987, calls for the
following force structure improvements: construction or
purchase of 14 destroyers, 6 submarines, 13 minesweepers, 6
missile boats, 10 auxiliary ships, 50 P-3C ASW patrol
planes, 61 HSS-2 and 2 SH-60B ASW helicopters.^'^ This level
of procurement is generally impressive, however, defense
spending in 1983 and 1984 was not sufficient to achieve
these targets by the year 1987.
The total number of new equipment planned for in the
1982 Mid-Term Defense Program is not significant enough to
dramatically increase the MSDF ' s overall size or capability.
The program provides for improvement in the quality of the
equipment in position and replacement of antiquated items.
This new equipment, including some of the best U.S. devices,
will maximize the capabilities of the limited number of
units the Japanese are willing to fund, and should improve
the defensive capability of the MSDF.
^








In crucial warfare areas, the JMSDF is procuring some of
the most sophisticated U.S. systems available for foreign
military sales. As mentioned, the JMSDF is strengthening
anti-air warfare capability with the installation of CWIS,
and chaff launchers, on all-new combatants, while new guided
missile destroyers are receiving the advanced SM-l-MR
surface-to-air missile.^*"*
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is also being improved.
Current ASW programs will enhance the JMSDF capability in
that area, including deployment of the AN/SQR-18A tactical
towed array passive sonar on helicopter-carrying destroyers,
licensed production in Japan of the Lockheed P-3C Update II
ASW patrol aircraft and the MK-46 Modification 5 ASW
torpedo, and procurement of two SH-60B helicopters in prepa-
ration for their production in Japan. ^^^
In other warfare areas, installation of the Harpoon
anti-ship missile on new MSDF ships, P3-C patrol aircraft
and submarines is an important step toward an effective
anti-surface warfare capability. In mine warfare, current
plans include building new ships, equipping them with modern
mine-hunting systems, and adding new airborne mine counter-
measures helicopters, as well.^'^
This progress is positive, but it's not enough. Prime
Minister Nakasone has gone on record to protect sea lanes to
1,000 miles and, should war break out, to bottle up the
Soviet fleet in the Sea of Japan. ^*^ To accomplish this,
some Reagan Administration officials have said privately
that Japan would have to increase military spending 10 to 12
^'"R. T. Pretty, ed . Jane's Weapon Systems 1977 , 8th
ed. (New York: Jane's Yearbooks , Franklin watts , 1976) p.
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percent a year.^'* Australian, T. B. Millar considers Japan
must "increase the present Japanese navy by about a factor
of three"^'^ This is in contrast to the 6.55 percent
increase in the Japanese military budget in 1984.^^° to meet
their stated commitments.
It's debateable how much the JMSDF must grow to meet the
1,000 mile sea lane patrol commitment. It is clear,
however, that the JMSDF needs more ships than it currently
has to do the job. As U.S. pressure mounts to spend more on
defense, the JMSDF will .likely explore new methods of
responding to that pressure.
IBS New York Times
,
26 January 1984, p. 1
1 8 9 <
'T. B. Millar, "Australia and the Security of the
Pacific Basin." in "National Security Interest in the
Pacific Basin, ed. Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution,





X. ROK NAVY AND JMSDF COMPARED
Both the modern ROK Navy and JMSDF began with
American-built equipment, and subsequently decided to design
and build their own ships. Both navies still rely most
heavily on U.S. weapons systems for their major source of
firepower. Both utilize U.S. Navy procedures for operations
and U.S. designed training programs . Both have destroyers
and frigates as their capital ships, no aircraft carriers,
and naval aviation arms for ASW only. Both have Harpoon
missiles, 5-inch guns and MK-44 torpedoes, all U.S.
weapons . Neither has nuclear weapons
.
There are also dissimilarities between the two organiza-
tions. Japan has relatively modern ships, all built in the
late 60 's and 70' s. With the exception of one new destroyer,
the ROK has World War II vintage destroyers and frigates.
The ROK has perhaps only one non-nuclear submarine, while
the MSDF has 14 non-nuclear powered submarines . ^ ^ ^ Japan has
almost no amphibious capability, while the ROK troop lift,
landing and extraction of forces capabilities are signifi-
cant for a navy its size.^^^ The ROK recognizes the value of
and practises amphibious assault, while Japan does not.
Both navies are professional; the ROK Navy has an urgency
about it born from their well-placed mistrust of the DPRK
.
This drive sharpens the readiness of the ROK Navy, making it
slightly mora professional.
Perhaps the greatest difference between the two navies,
is their dissimilar primary missions. The ROK Navy is
primarily a coastal defense Navy designed to defend against
'"'Moore, Jane's Ships 1984-85
,
p. 311.
'"^International Institute, Balance, p. 101
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the possibility of an attack or infiltration by the DPRK.
Its focus is centered on stopping or neutralizing small,
high speed craft and diesel-powered submarines from pene-
trating ROK Navy defenses.
The JMSDF has coastal defense concerns, but is primarily
concerned with protecting the sea-lanes out to 1,000 miles
and, in the event of war, blockading the Soviet fleet in the
Sea of Japan. ^^' These assignments are vast, and require
more ships and manpower than the Japanese are willing to
devote to them.
Differences aside, the ROK Navy and the JMSDF are
compatible enough in important areas to make the mechanics
of naval cooperation possible. With common
U. S . -manufactured weapons systems, the two navies can under-
stand the warfare capabilities of the other. Since both
work separately with the U.S. in Team Spirit or RIMPAC exer-
cises
,
both are required to communicate in the English
language. A common language facilitates coordination and
exercise conduct. Since both navies use tactical procedures
familiar to the U.S., both the ROK Navy and JMSDF could
cooperate without learning new tactical procedures.
No dissimilarity mentioned in this section is so serious
as to preclude future ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. In
fact, prevailing similaritites between the ROK Navy and
JMSDF support such cooperation.
^^^Haberman, "Talk of Arms," New York Times, pp. 1 and
4.
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XI. COOPERATION- -IS IT POSSIBLE ?
Is future cooperation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF
possible? Perhaps, but some significant hurdles must first
be overcome. First, there is the age-old animosity between
Korea and Japan. Koreans believe that they predated the
Japanese, while some Japanese believe the opposite. Recent
archaeological finds support Korea's position. ^ ^ '' Since the
Japanese believe that they were created by the gods as a
special race of people, like no other, they view the Koreans
as inferior, ill-bred and ill-mannered people. Conversely,
the Koreans view the Japanese as arrogant, pushy and
boorish.
At no time were these ill feelings as pronounced as
during the Japanese occupation of Korea, from 1910-1945.
Shortly after that annexation, Japan reduced the Korean
Emperor to the title of "King"; Korea's name was changed
from Taehan (Daikan) to the old name of Choson (Chosen) ; all
treaties between Korea and other nations were void^^^ the
official language of Korea became Japanese; and Shinto was
promoted as the preferred religion. ^^^
The Japanese wanted to improve the quality of Korean
life, and did raise the standard of living somewhat.
However, Korea was reshaped to serve Japan's needs. Korea
became Japan's "rice bowl," and its industrial sector was
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controlled industry, transportation and communication,
dominating the economic life of Korea. ^^^ As. described by
Woo-keun Han, "The Korean people were completely excluded
from their own economy, which now became simply a source of
profits and supplies for Japan. "^^^
The Japanese also dominated Korea politically. They
established a pyramidal system of government with a Japanese
Governor-General (a military officer of Flag or General
rank) positioned at the top.^"" Some Koreans were appointed
to governmental positions, yet, the Japanese retained
control. A tight security rein was maintained over the
political scene by the use of Japanese secret police. ^°^
Kyung Cho Chung describes the period this way:
"Consequently, Japan dominated not only the political but
also the economic life of the Korean people. Japanese occu-
pation witnessed the transformation of Korea into a Japanese
colony. "^°^
Korean animosity toward the Japanese continued after
World War II. Unfortunately j liberating American forces in
the South initially used Japanese personnel as the only
experienced government officials available to run the Korean
government. This seemed appropriate at the time, but
incensed the Koreans who wondered what "liberation" really
meant. The Japanese officials were soon replaced, but the
damage was done.^"^
^^^Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Koreaii Nationalism
(Berkeley: University of~~Califorma Press , 1963 )~ pT 9tn
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In recent years , the enmity between Japan and South
Korea continued, but with a few bright spots. Diplomatic
relations were restored in 1965, with the signing of the
Japanese-Korean Normalization Treaty.^"'* Japanese Prime
Minister Sato promoted a closer relationship between the
Republic of Korea and Japan and declared in 1969, "The
security of the Republic of Korea is essential to Japan's
own security . "^ °
^
The Tanaka government that followed Sato distanced Japan
from the Republic of Korea. by attempting to achieve closer
ties with Pyongyang and Beijing. In the summer of 1974,
Tanaka 's Foreign Minister, Kimura Toshio, stated, "The ROK
government is not the only legitimate government on the
Korean peninsula." He further stated, "There is no threat
from North Korea against South Korea," and not "the peace
and security of South Korea," but, "the peace and security
of the entire Korean peninsula is vital to Japan's own
security . "^ " ^ The ROK reaction to this was one of growing
concern over this new Japanese acceptance of the DPRK.
In August, 1973, ROK dissident leader Kim Dae- Jung was
kidnapped in Tokyo by a group widely suspected to be agents
of the South Korean government. This strained ROK - Japan
relations significantly.^""' Tokyo - Seoul relations took a
turn for the worse, in 1974, when two Japanese youths were
arrested and tried for an attempted overthrow of the South
Korean government . ^ ° ^ The situation almost exploded with the
August 15, 1974, assassination attempt on South Korean
2 It Clyde and Beers, Far East
,
p. 484
^°^Hong N. Kim,, Japan s Policy Toward the Korean
Peninsula Since 1965," in The Two Koreas in World Politics,
eds
.
Tae-Hwan Kwak, Wayne Parterson and~T:dward A": ulsen(Seoul, Korea: Kyungnam University Press, 1983), p. 305.
^"'Quoted in Kim, "Japan's Policy," p. 308.
^"'Buss, Background for Policy
, p. 109.
^°'Kim, "Japan's Policy," p. 309.
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President Park, in which his wife was killed. The assassin
was Moon Se Kwang, a Korean resident of Japan. The Seoul
government demanded an apology from Japan, but none was
forthcoming.^"^ The inauguration of the Miki government in
December, 1974, "normalized" Japan - ROK relations following
the friction created by events during Tanaka's
government , ^ ^
"
The next Japanese government, under the leadership of
Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, came under fire in 1977. Many
South Koreans believed that Prime Minister Fukuda knuckled
under to the United States when Japan failed to openly crit-
icize President Carter's planned U.S. troop withdrawal from
South Korea. ^^^ The Carter troop withdrawal proposal created
a crisis of confidence in ROK - U.S. - Japan relations. The
South Koreans, understandably, felt betrayed and the
Japanese were upset about not being consulted prior to the
announcement of the withdrawal plans. The Japanese feared
that the withdrawal would be regionally destabilizing and
could trigger an expanded North-South Korea arms race. In
response to this concern Prime Minister Fukuda traveled to
Washington to meet with President Carter. Though he did not
openly criticize the President, Prime Minister Fukuda did
receive Carter's assurance that no withdrawal would occur
before consultation between U.S. - ROK - Japanese officials
could ensure peace was maintained on the peninsula . ^ ^ ^ Thus,
the ROK concern of Japan knuckling under to U.S. pressure
was probably not a valid one; but it was a perception.
^"^Clyde and Beers, Far East
,
p. 485.
^^°Buss, Background for Policy
, pp. 109-110.
2'
'Kim, "Japan's Policy," p. 312.
^'^Buss, Background for Policy
, pp. 110-111.
67
In July, 1979, President Carter announced he would
suspend his South Korean troop withdrawal plan. This deci-
sion met with approval by the ROK and the Ohira administra-
tion in Tokyo, which replaced the Fukuda government . ^ ^
^
To further military cooperation and forestall future
U.S. troop withdrawal attempts, the Director-General of the
Japanese Defense Agency, Yamashita Ganri, visited Seoul to
confer with South Korean Defense Minister Ro Jae-Hyun.
During these talks, agreement was made to increase the
number of visits between military officials of the two coun-
tries and allow ROK Naval units to call at Japanese
ports.'''*
The assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October
26, 1979, and the tough clamp down on Korean dissidents by
Park's successor, President Chun Doo Hwan, again soured ROK
- Japan relations. ROK dissident leader Kim Dae Jung's
death sentence for sedition exacerbated memories of Kim's
kidnapping. This was such a sensitive issue that it prom-
ised to short-circuit all earlier goodwill gestures between
the two countries. President Chun's decision to commute
Kim's sentence was a big step in the right direction to get
ROK - Japanese relations back on track. ^'^
In July, 1982, Japanese - ROK relations once more took a
turn for the worse when the South Korean news media reported
that Japan had revised its school textbooks to gloss over
its colonization period of Korea from 1910 - 1945. The
South Korean public was furious and demanded a retraction.
The issue was settled, when South Korea accepted Japan's
promise to revise the disputed textbooks within two years by




''Jacqueline Reditt, "South Korea President Chun's
3-Year-Old Rule Settles in to a Limited Democracy,"
Christian Science Monitor
, 28 April 1983, pp. 12-13.
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using new guidelines to be established by the Education
Ministry. ^ ^ ^
In November, 1982, Prime Minister Nakasone was elected
to his first term as Japan's Prime Minister and shortly
thereafter scheduled a visit to the Republic of Korea. ^^'
During the visit, President Chun accepted the Japanese offer
of $4 billion in a public loan, thus settling a nagging
dispute between the two countries . ^ i
s
This dispute centered around the amount of loan desired
by the ROK, and the official justification for the loan.
Discussions began in the summer of 1981 when the ROK
requested $6 billion for their significant effort and
contribution to the security of Japan. South Korea's trade
deficit was also mentioned. The implication was that the
ROK was paying Japan's regional security bills and had to
factor that additional cost into their own trade. ^^^
Tokyo did not agree with the amount, nor the purpose of
the loan, so talks became stalled and unpleasant. Prime
Minister Nakasone and President Chun realized that a compro-
mise on this issue would be beneficial to both nations and
be a mutually positive political move, as well. They agreed
on a $4 billion loan consisting of $1.85 billion at




^Geoffrey Murray, "Japan's Junior High Schoolers Lea
(Again) of Their Nation's Militarism," Christian Scien
Monitor, 7 June 1983, p. 9.
^^^Takashi Oka, "Japanese Premier to Patch Up Korean
Ties Before US Trip," Christian Science Monitor, 7 January
1983, p. 8.
^^^Takashi Oka, "Japan's Nakasone Explores Common Ground
With Korea," Christian Science Monitor
,
13 January 1983, p.
^^^"Japan Government Plans to Grant Aid to South
Koreans," wall Street Journal, 13 January 1983, p. 34.
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export -import bank loans at higher rates. The purpose of
the loan was not declared, thereby diffusing the security
and trade deficit issues. ^^^
Following the Seoul summit of January 11-12, 1983, a
joint communique was issued that concentrated on the peace
and stability of the Korean Peninsula as crucial* to Japan's
security. It also praised the ROK peace overtures to the
DPRK and set up a "Hotline" between Seoul and Tokyo to aid
in potential disputes of the future. This was the first
visit of a Japanese Prime Minister to South Korea since
1965.^2^
Perhaps an even more historic and important event
occured in September, 1984, when President Chun Doo Hwan
visited Japan, as the only Korean President to make an offi-
cial call on a Japanese Emperor. This event was like a
healing balm for ROK - Japanese relations. In preparation
for the visit, the Japanese put on a pro-Republic of Korea
public information blitz. ^^^ The visit, which went extremely
well, was highlighted by Emperor Hirohito's toast:
...Our two countries were thus bound by deep neigh-
borly relations over the ages.
In spite of such relations, however, it is indeed
regrettable that there was an unfortunate past between
us for a period in this century, and I believe that it
should, not be repeated again.
Today, I am deeply gratified that friendship and good
will between our two countries are going to be increas-
ingly deepened for the future and an age of shared pros-




^2°0ka, "Japan's Nakasone," p. 5.
^^^Oka, "Japanese Premier," p. 8.
^^
^Comments of Professor Edward A. Olsen based on his
observations in Japan during Chun's visit. Naval




' s Remarks to Chun on Korea Ties" New York
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More than any event, this visit healed the wounds of the
past and gave hope for the future. Yet, what does this mean
to potential future cooperation between the ROK Navy and the
JMSDF? Simply stated, cooperation in 1945 was impossible.
Cooperation in 1985 is, given the proper encouragement and
the right circumstances, quite possible. To support this
claim of possible cooperation between the JMSDF and the ROK
Navy, we must examine the other questions posed by this
thesis, namely. How? When? What form? What responsibili-
ties? Is it in our best interest? Asia's best interest?
Who would favor it? Who would not?
A. ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION
There are several important reasons why ROK Navy and
JMSDF cooperation would be in the best interest of both
countries. The first is that it would be cost-effective
from a defense expenditure standpoint. By coordinating
their effects in a specific geographic area of protection,
each nation would be able to use their existing fleets to
bring about a higher degree of security, without spending a
great deal more on defense.
This is important to both nations, but perhaps more so
to Japan, which is under heavy U.S. pressure to increase
military spending and assume more defense responsibility in
the Far East. This issue is so sensitive to the Japanese
people that Prime Minister Nakasone was required to promise
the one percent limit on defense spending would not be
violated in 1984, prior to his acceptance by the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), as its Presidential candidate . ^ ^ "*
^ ^ "* "Nakasone Renews Pledge on Defense Spending Limit,'
FBIS, Daily Report , East Asia and Pacific , 13 May 1983, p
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Some U.S. Congressional officials continue to be dissat-
isfied with Japan's security contribution and agree with
former Commander and Chief U.S. Forces in the Pacific,
Admiral Robert Long, when he states: "I continue to
strongly urge them (Japan) to increase their defense
budget-~not for offensive capacity, but strictly for the
defense of Japan. "^^^ Washington wants Tokyo to push for
some tangible goals " in terms of numbers of ships and
aircraft. As a minimum, the U.S. wants to see Japan with at
least 350 modern interceptor fighters, 70 destroyers and
frigates, 25 submarines and 125 modern antisubmarine warfare
patrol aircraft before the end of this decade. ^^^
Tokyo's latest defense plan for 1983-1987 falls short of
this U.S. goal and calls for 140-155 fighters, 60
destroyers and 72 antisubmarine patrol aircraft. ^^^ Current
annual defense spending is not reaching a level to support
even this build-up. ^^'
A cooperative effort between the ROK Navy and JMSDF
could enhance the flexibility of the naval forces that each
nation already has, and give them increased defense capa-
bility for no more money. How could the ROK and Japan get
something for nothing? By cooperating, the total number of
combined units would be as follows: 69 destroyers and
frigates, 14 submarines (all Japanese), 482 fighter aircraft
(F-15, F-4, F-5), and 89 antisubmarine warfare aircraft
(P-3, S-2, P-2).223
^^^Takashi Oka, "US Admiral Urges Japan To Increase Its
Defense Budget," Christian Science Honitor
,
24 June 1983, p.
6 .
^^
^Geoffrey Murray, "Rearming Japan: Nakasone's
Policies Renew Old Debate," Christian Science Monitor, 4
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^ ^
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The tactical value of these larger numbers would be
flexibility; flexibility to respond to provocation from the
DPRK , from Soviet pressure in the Kuriles, or from a
blockade of the straits. If properly trained, these naval
forces could be as effective as forces from a single
country. Thus, from a dollar cost standpoint, cooperation
would strongly benefit both the ROK and Japan.
A second important reason for the ROK and Japan to
establish this cooperation is that it would help meet goals
set by the United States. As already mentioned, the
Republic of Korea and Japan have proportionally large trade
surpluses with the United States. For the first time in 71
years, the U.S. is approaching the status of a net debtor
nation, with a $101.6 billion deficit in 1984,2^° No one
would entirely blame either the ROK or Japan for the U.S.
trade problems. A strong dollar abroad, coupled with some
U.S. inefficiency and just plain mistakes, have spelled
problems for U.S. exporters. However, these disturbing
trade statistics will cause the U.S. to look harder for ways
to save money, putting more pressure on the ROK and Japan to
assume a larger share of the U.S. defense burden. A joint
ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation agreement would please the U.S.
and, thus, help to lessen this pressure.
A third benefit for ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation would
be a strengthening of the developing relationship between
the two nations. As discussed, the relationship between
these two culturally linked nations has often been stormy,
yet is currently on the upswing. This cooperation would be
an additional positive step towards understanding and
friendship
.
^'""Record U.S. Trade Deficit in 84; Factor Use Falls "
A. P. Wire service Report in the Monterey Peninsula Herald,
19 March 1985, p. 13. ^ —
73
Cooperation could extend to better economic and polit-
ical relations. South Korea, which experienced a $23
billion trade deficit with Japan between 1965 and 1982^^^ is
interested in narrowing that margin with broader access to
the Japanese market. Another issue which the two countries
have discussed, but not solved, is the legal status of
Korean residents in Japan. There are about 670,000 Koreans
living in Japan. Many of them were born in Japan, speak
Japanese, have lived there throughout their lives, but are
still considered foreigners. They are therefore, not enti-
tled to Japanese social welfare programs and must be finger-
printed when registering with local authorities. Even
Japanese criminal suspects are not fingerprinted unless a
warrant for their arrest is issued. ^^^
There is also the issue of Japanese economic "aid" to
the ROK, which South Korea considers payment for their high
levels of military spending which tangentially ensures
Japan's security. The Japanese, on the other hand, offi-
cially consider this as bonafide economic aid to a devel-
oping neighbor.
These civil issues could incidentally benefit from
defense cooperation. As defense cooperation progressed, it
is possible that these non-defense matters could enjoy a
"coat-tail" effect. The more mutual defense-related contact
between Japanese and South Koreans as equals , the harder it
will be to maintain animosity between the two nations on
civil issues.
Japan is concerned about economic competition from an
emerging "new Japan" in the Republic of Korea. During
former President Park's regime, ROK exports increased on the
average of 42 percent annually, stimulating a 10 percent
"''Kim, "Japan's Policy," p. 318.
^^^Clyde Haberman, "An American Alien in Japan Feels
'Like a Criminal'," New York Times, 21 July 1983, p. A2
.
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average annual growth rate in GNP.^^^ In the 1970' s, South
Korea became the fastest-growing economy in the non-OPEC
Third World. By the end of the Park regime, South Korean
exports amounted to 5 percent of the U.S. imports and 3
percent of Japan's, from virtually none a decade before. ^^''
Today, Korea's growth continues to exceed expectations.
Real GNP grew 9.6 percent in the first quarter of 1983, and
the projection for GNP growth in 1984 is 8.1 per cent . ^ ^
^
This growth in GNP has been aided significantly by a 50
percent increase in domestic construction (some in prepara-
tion for the 1988 Olympics) and a real growth of 7 percent
in exports . ^ ^ ^
If the Seoul Olympics are smoothly executed, and the ROK
will do everything to ensure that they are. South Korea will
get more worldwide positive media exposure than it ever has.
This exposure will likely be exploited favorably by the ROK
to do things like encourage foreign investment and, perhaps
use Madison Avenue techniques to sell Hyundai cars. As Time
magazine proclaims-:
World auto makers do not rank among big league players
until they sell their cars in the U.S. , the world's
richest auto showroom. Last week South Korea announced
its bid for a place in that market. Executives of
Hyundai Motor America, a subsidiary of South Korea's
largest industrial conglomerate (est. 1984, sales:
$10.3 billion), said that they will begin selling cars
in the U.S. this fall. 2^^




^^^U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration, Foreign Economic Trends and Their
Implications for the UniTed States r~ PET 84^13 "O^shington
D. C . : Government Printing Office, March, 1984), p. 4.




'"Korean Chrome Heads for the U.S.," Time, February
11, 1985, p. 72.
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As a warm-up to the American market, Hyundai sold its
subcompact cars last year in Canada. Hoping to initially
sell 5,000 cars, Hyundai's pony car sales topped 25,000, or
11 percent of the Canadian import market, largely because of
their $4,600 base price. ^^* This concerns Japanese car
makers, who understand from their own successes * how lucra-
tive the inexpensive car market in the U.S. can be.
Japan is concerned that their lead in inexpensively-
produced, quality-manufactured goods could evaporate in the
hands of cheaper South Korean labor competition. As Michio
Mizoguchi, a top Foreign Ministry official puts it when he
talks about foreign economic competition, "China is running.
Korea is running. Singapore is running. India is
running. "^^^ Japan does not want to be beaten.
Military cooperation and mutual security could facili-
tate greater ROK - Japan economic cooperation, as well.
Japan could benefit the ROK by sharing its U.S. marketing
skill, while the ROK could allow Japan to invest and share
in the profits as the South Korean economy expands.
A fourth reason that Japan and the Republic of Korea
would benefit from cooperation between their navies is that
each would increase their national security. No where is
this more viable than on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK is
equipped with 21 submarines, 4 frigates, and some 418
smaller, yet capable patrol craft; some with missiles, some
without.^"" The commitment of the MSDF to work with the ROK
Navy to blunt its primary adversary would be welcome in
Seoul
.
2 3 8 Ibid.
,
p. 72.
^^^John S. Lang, "Samurai Spirit Lives On in Japan's
Economic Drive," U.S. News and World Report, 19 November






In return, the ROK Navy could conduct joint operations
in the Sea of Japan and assist in supporting Japan's promise
to provide naval protection for commercial sea-lanes
extending 1,000 nautical miles from Japan. ^''^ This sea-lane
protection is crucial to the well-being of both Japan and
the ROK. If the Soviets were able to deny the "freedom of
shipping lane transit to Japan and the ROK, their respective
economies would be seriously damaged. ^"^ A joint ROK Navy -
JMSDF cooperation agreement to protect the maritime lines of
communication to 1,000 miles from Japan, would be viewed
favorably by Washington, and take some of the pressure off
the U.S. Seventh Fleet. 2"*'
Finally, JMSDF and ROK Navy cooperation with U.S.
blessing would bring more autonomy from U.S. security
demands and a larger voice in the development of adequate
regional security measures. This autonomy would advance
prestige, which both Japan^'*'* and the ROK secretly
desire . ^ '* ^
From the United States' perspective, this increased
autonomy could be a mixed blessing. On the positive side,
greater autonomy brings with it greater responsibility.
Seoul and Tokyo would have more say in what they should do
^ "* ^ "Text of Communique on Reagan-Suzuki Discussions,"
New York Times
,
9 May 19S1, p. 7.
^'*
^Claude A. Buss, ed . Introductory comments in
"National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin." Hoover
Institution, Stanford California, 1984, p. 98. (Xeroxed)
^'*
^Daniel Southerland, "Mansfield: Crucial Year In
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^Robert Keatley, "South Korea's President Seeks
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77
for their own security, but they'd also have more to do.
This could mean increased levels of military spending on
their part to meet the challenge of this new responsibility.
On the negative side, increased ROK and Japanese defense
spending might not be forthcoming. This is an important
issue, for it is doubtful that the U.S. would embrace a plan
that offered significantly less U.S. control with zero
increase in ROK Navy/JMSDF ships. If the plan drastically
curtails U.S. military influence in the region, then the
U.S. would have to be assured that the ROK Navy - JMSDF
cooperation could effectively assume the defense burden.
Future study beyond the scope of this thesis should be
conducted to determine under what circumstances the U.S.
would be willing to reduce military control in return for
greater security contributions from Japan and Korea.
B. IF SO, WHEN?
If cooperation can take place, when can it be realized?
Cooperation could come as early as the end of this decade.
It could come as late as never. The key seems to be, what
each country will tolerate politically and popularly.
As Lieutenant Colonel Yoshihisa Nakamura , of the
Japanese, Ground Self-Defense Force and professor of Defense
Studies at the Japanese National Defense Academy said in an
interview:
If the Navies were left to themselves, cooperation could
begin almost immediately. Defacto low key cooperation
is the key. Begin with officer exchange programs, then
slowly increase with a low key port visit here, a small
exercise there. If it was done this way... maybe cooper-
ation in 5-6 years. If it is done orficially with a
high profile, it will take much more than 10 years
before cooperation begins . ^ "
^
Interview with Yoshihisa Nakamura, Lieutenant
Colonel, Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force, Professor of
Defense Studies at the Japanese National Defense Academy.
Monterey, California, 22 January 1985.
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To Colonel Nakamura, "low key" efforts are essential to the
early success of any cooperation blueprint. Politically and
operationally it is simpler to begin with small steps toward
a larger goal. Public opinion in the ROK and Japan will be
a significant factor determining how quickly to proceed, yet
public opinion in these countries is influenced, in part, by
governmental policy. While the "low key" approach is prob-
ably best to start, Seoul and Tokyo will have to assert
their influence at some point if ROK - Japanese cooperation
is to succeed.
C. ' WHAT FORM MIGHT THIS COOPERATION TAKE?
A good deal more water will have to pass under the
bridge before either the ROK or Japan will be willing to
permit any of their forces to be commanded by an officer
from the other country. If cooperation depended on this,
then it probably wouldn't happen. This is where the United
States, and particularly the U.S. Navy, must play a key
role.
The U.S. Navy is likely the only authority that both the
ROK Navy and the JMSDF would permit their ships to serve
under. There are at least two reasons for this: U.S.
financial strength and U.S. regional security contribution.
If the ROK and Japan would submit to any country's authority
in joint operations, it would be the United States.
The United States could develop a plan that would permit
these two to cooperate without requiring either of them to
accept the supremacy of the other. This could be accom-
plished without increasing the size of U.S. staffs at all.
For example. Commander Seventh Fleet could be charged with
the additional responsibility of "Commander Naval Forces
Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United States" or
ComNavForJROKUS (pronounced Jay-rock-us ) . CNFJROKUS '
s
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principal assistants could be the already existing Commander
Naval Forces Japan (CNFJ) and Commander Naval Forces Korea
(CNFK) and their host country counterparts.
When exercises involving the three countries were sched-
uled, each country could plan a portion of the exercise.
This would permit the assignment of each participant as
Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) for a particular event.
Yet the Officer in overall Command of the entire Exercise
(OCE) would continue to be the senior U.S. officer present.
These exercises could start small, but develop into
significant events involving all phases of warfare opera-
tions, including ASW, AAW, ASUW, and amphibious landings.
Port visits could be arranged, perhaps highlighting one
country for each exercise. Basic United States Navy
tactical procedures could be used to coordinate communica-
tions, tactical maneuvers, drills, etc.
The exercises could soon become as important, and
exciting as NATO and RIMPAC exercises already are. With
proper planning. They could improve professionalism and
readiness in each of the navies and promote goodwill at the
same time.
If an actual crisis occurred', Japan and the Republic of
Korea could operate autonomously until the U.S. Navy arrived
on the scene to assume overall command of the forces avail-
able. This inefficiency is bothersome, but necessary until
such time as the Republic of Korea and Japan can operate
without U.S. leadership.
To promote ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation without U.S.
leadership, a time might come when the U.S. will want to
explore rotating the overall command of exercises between
the three nations. Before this can happen, the ROK and
Japan will have to be willing to submit to the other's
command during specific exercise periods. The U.S. will
also have to place its designated exercise ships under ROK
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Navy or JMSDF command during specified periods. The day is
long away when each of the three nations will accept these
command arrangements, but effective cooperation will eventu-
ally bring the questions of shared command to the fore.
The U.S. Navy plays a key role in cooperation between
the ROK Navy and the JMSDF and must demonstrate* leadership
and enthusiasm. U.S. Navy liaison officers who will ride
ROK and Japanese naval" forces ships during exercises must be
carefully selected to ensure professionalism, statesmanship,"
and a positive approach to events.
The U.S. Navy will have to initially adjust to standards
of operation not commensurate with high U.S. training
levels. However, the ROK and Japanese improvement will
likely be dramatic in a short period of time. By the end of
an exercise, each nation, including the United States, will
be better able to operate as an effective team in defense of
East Asia.
This new-found professionalism can only serve to
gratify. The pride of the ROK Navy and the JMSDF will be
conceived out of their knowledge that they can "run with the
big boys." Serving to enhance this pride, the U.S. Navy
must gradually give more responsibility in each exercise to
the ROK and JMSDF to permit them to grow and flourish.
D. WHAT SECURITY BURDENS CAN BE SHARED?
This question is a difficult one because it requires a
hard look at the sea lane areas near Japan and Korea, and an
evaluation of what can reasonably be expected of the JMSDF
and the ROK Navy. Figure 11.1 illustrates the Sea of Japan
and the Tsushima, Shimonoseki, Soya and Tsugaru straits.
One look at the location of the Soviets' important Naval
bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk is all that is neces-
sary to understand the immense strategic importance of the







Figure 11.1 Sea of Japan and Surrounding Straits
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The Sea of Japan's water washes the shores of the USSR,
DPRK, ROK and Japan, yet it has only three usable exits.
They are the Tsushima Strait between the ROK and Japan,
Tsugaru Strait between Hokkaido and Japan's main island of
Honshu, and the Soya Strait between the Soviet island of
Sakhalin and Japan's Hokkaido.
The Soviets' largest Naval base in the Far East is
Vladivostock with about three-fourths of the USSR Far East
fleet homeported there. While Vladivostok has a strong
logistics network to support it, the ships homeported there
are susceptible to wartime mining of the Straits. This
could effectively prevent those ships from participating in
an open ocean warfare scenario, because they would be unable
to break free of the Sea of Japan. ^''^
Petropavlovsk, on the other hand, is the home for the
Soviets' most modern ballistic missile submarines, best
attack submarines, and other surface ships capable of
fighting the U.S. Seventh Fleet. While it is an ice-free
port on the Pacific Ocean, it has virtually no supply
infrastructure to support it, and must be supplied almost
exclusively by the sea. Its greatest supplier of require-
ments Is Vladivostok. In times of war, without the seaborne
supply link from Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk would eventually
become operationally emasculated, and of little use to ships
that badly needed supplies.^"*'
Vice Admiral Holcomb, USN (Ret.), former Commander U.S.
Seventh Fleet maintains that the 24-mile stretch of water
between the Soviet island of Sakhalin and Japan's Hokkaido
is the "number one priority" ^ ** ^ for Soviet planners.
^'•^Takashi Oka, "US, Soviet Naval Strategies in N.
Pacific: Geography the Key," Christian Science Monitor, 3








Without the ability to transit the Soya Strait, the Soviet
Navy could be tactically disadvantaged in a wartime situ-
ation to the point of eventual failure.
Due to its location with respect to the Korean
Peninsula, the Yellow Sea is also of significance. It is
the primary operation area of the West Sea Fleet Command of
the DPRK Navy, headquartered at Nampo . ^ ^ " The Yellow Sea,
whose waters wash the shores of China, the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Korea, is
vital to the security of South Korea. If North Korea's West
Sea Fleet was able to deny the ROK passage of the Yellow
Sea, the security of the whole of South Korea would be in
question. As General MacArthur dramatically demonstrated by
his daring and successful September 15, 1950, amphibious
landing at Inchon, ^^^ the Yellow Sea must never fall
completely into DPRK hands.
These two bodies of water, the Sea of Japan and the
Yellow. Sea, their straits and the shipping lanes out to
1,000 miles from those straits, seem to be ideal for cooper-
ation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF . Using the command
structure discussed in the previous section, the cooperating
forces, under U.S. command could assume primary patrol
responsibility for these assignments.
Included in this responsibility would be the assignment
to prevent the USSR from deploying its naval forces from
Vladivostok during a wartime scenario. This could require a
combination of mining of the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya





^^^Cagle and Manson, Sea War, p. 75.
^^^Takashi Oka, "US, Soviet Strategies," p.
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Whenever a United States aircraft carrier's power was
required in either of these two seas, the JMSDF and ROK Navy
could provide the ship escorts required for that U.S.
carrier. These escorts would be subject to U.S. control and
fulfill the role of U.S. cruisers, destroyers, and frigates
in the discharge of their duties. This readjustment in ship
assignment would free some U.S. Navy ships for other duties,
such as sea lanes of communication protection, convoy duty,
and anti-submarine warfare assignments.
There is one important . area the U.S. must continue to
solely control; nuclear weapons. The nuclear umbrella must
be maintained by the U.S. and the U.S. alone. This could
create some animosity because of the unique, destructive
nature of this weaponry. Japan has a natural aversion to
these weapons, for obvious reason. The recent decision by
New Zealand's government to deny U.S. Navy ships permission
to call in New Zealand ports^^^ could have far-reaching
implications in Japan. New Zealand's response could lend
support to Japan's versions of West Germany's Green Party,
the anti-nuclear, environmental group. While Japan's
version of the Green Party had only 500 members in 1983,
this figure could grow if the New Zealand response is viewed
with approval by the Japanese . ^ ^ '*
To date, Japanese opponents of nuclear arms are
utilizing a peaceful approach, as in the collection of 32
million signatures on a petition against the nuclear arms
race.^^^ It is important to remind these anti-nuclear
Japanese that the U.S. nuclear deterrent has worked, as
advertised, for there has been no nuclear war between the
^^
^Bernard Gwertzman, "New Zealander Wants to Avoid
Fight With U.S.," New York Times, 16 July 1984, p. 1.
^^
''Geoffrey Murray, "USS Enterprise Visit to Japan:
Less Turmoil Than In 1968," Christian Science Monitor, 23





U.S. and the Soviet Union. In the absence of the U.S.
nuclear deterrent, no one knows exactly what the Soviets
would do. The U.S. nuclear umbrella must continue in its
present form of direction and control to ensure its
effectiveness
.
The Soviets have countered the U.S. nuclear umbrella by
attempting to intimidate Japan with deployment of their
SS-20 missiles. As "the Japanese Defense "White Paper"
discusses:
The non-strategic nuclear forces, particularly
i-ntermediate- range nuclear forces (INF), judging from
their range, are primarily aimed at countries around the
Soviet Union, such as the NATO countries, Japan and
China rather than the United States. The Soviet Union
seems to be trying to alienate the United States from
other free nations within range of Soviet INF by
creating doubts about the credibility of U.S. nuclear
deterrent power through the massive deployment of Soviet
INF.^^^^
Japan has promised to abide by "three non-nuclear princi-
ples:... not to possess, not to manufacture, and not to
introduce nuclear weapons into the country. "^^^ The U.S.,
therefore, must remain as the only nuclear deterrent force
that prevents Soviet nuclear adventurism in this region.
E. THE EFFECTS OF COOPERATION
1. The United States
Cooperation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF is^ in
the best interest of the U.S. The advantages simply over-
power the disadvantages. On the positive side; the U.S.
would enjoy greater Far East security with fewer U.S. Navy
ship commitments, hence a better deployment cycle for Unites
States Navy Pacific Fleet ships. The ROK Navy and JMSDF







would improve their own readiness as they operated together
with the U.S. forces on a regular basis. After cooperation
became routine, the U.S. could divert some defense funding
or units from the Far East on a temporary basis, if it
became necessary to use them in another part of the world.
Flexibility would increase because more U.S. forces could be
available to respond to other threats in the region.
On the other side of the ledger, ROK Navy - JMSDF
cooperation could bring less U.S. influence in the security
of the Far East. As ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation increased,
and became more effective, it is conceivable that Japan
could demand that the U.S. withdraw its forces from Japan.
While security of the Far East could perhaps be delegated to
the strengthened ROK Navy - JMSDF team, it is unlikely that
Washington would view the demand to leave Japanese bases
with pleasure. ^'^ If ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation brought
with it a dramatic decrease in U.S. regional security influ-
ence, Washington might balk at the idea of cooperation.
Another potential problem is Japan's pacifistic
tendencies and what they mean to cooperation. A leading
public-opinion poll in 1983, asked the question: "What
would you do if Japan was invaded by a foreign power?" In
response, 44 percent of those polled said they would run
away or surrender, while only 20.6 per cent said they would
stay and fight. Of the younger respondents, aged 15-24
years old, 54 percent said they would run or surrender . ^ ^
^
This raises the question about Japanese resolve to
defend themselves and/or the Republic of Korea. In time of
war, is it conceivable that the Japanese could fail to
uphold their part of the ROK - JMSDF security agreement?
2 5 3 Takashi Oka, "Admiral: Cooperation," p. 1
^^
^Geoffrey Murray, "Pacifism Reigns in Japan As US
Pushes It To Rearm," Christian Science Monitor, 23 March
1983, pp. 1 and 14.
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Without Japan's full cooperation and promise to defend
itself and the ROK, cooperation would be disastrous for all
concerned.
How would Asia react? Who would be in favor of
cooperation; who against? A ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation
agreement would be in the best interest of the U.S.
Clearly, it would not be in the best interest of the USSR
and the DPRK. How about the rest of Asia? What would be
their response?
2. The People' s Republic of China (PRC)
The PRC is so preoccupied with economic recovery,
internal affairs, and the Soviet military on Chinese borders
that ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation may not seriously concern
them if cooperation doesn't impact on PRC sovereignty.
China could condemn the cooperation for the sake of their
friends in the DPRK. However, the PRC is too preoccupied
with other things to be overly concerned about naval cooper-
ation between Japan and the ROK.
The PRC does have legitimate security concerns in
the Yellow Sea. Its North Sea Fleet is composed of about
500 vessels, including 2 submarine squadrons, and uses the
Yellow Sea as its primary operating area.^^° The Yellow Sea
is also the primary operating area of the DPRK's West Coast
Fleet. The fact remains that the Navy is the smallest
branch of service for both of these nations. ^^^ The PRC Navy
has little impact on the Sino-Soviet conflict. As long as
the Yellow Sea remains a place where the PRC can operate
freely, then ROK - Japan naval cooperation would be of less
concern to them then the installation of more Soviet SS-20
missiles
.
.^^"International Institute Balance, p. 93
^^^Ibid.
,
pp. 92 and 103.
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The March, 1985, incident involving the PRC hydro-
foil attempting defection to the Republic of China is a case
in point. The PRC did not make an incident out of this,
save sending three small craft to attempt a "rescue" of the
stray hydrofoil. The ROK Navy sent these PRC Navy vessels
away with a "show of force. "^^^ Later the PRC simply
requested the return of its two remaining injured sailors,
to which the Republic of Korea agreed. ^^^ This low-key
approach to a generally significant incident demonstrates
the PRC is not overly concerned about seaborne issues, as
long as those issues are handled with understanding.
Of more significance to the PRC is the impact this
ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation would have on the DPRK
.
Friendly PRC-DPRK relations are more important than ever,
since the Soviet alliance with Vietnam. ^^'* A predominant
USSR position in the DPRK would disturb a PRC already wary
of the inroads the Soviets have made to encircle China.
Could a ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation pact so concern the
DPRK, that the PRC would oppose it, fearing enactment could
send North Korea to the Soviet camp? The answer to this
question is probably "no."
The PRC should continue to have several advantages
over the Soviets in competing for DPRK influence. First,
the historical and cultural affinity between Chinese and
Koreans is strong. Second, participation of Chinese
soldiers in the Korean War strengthened that bond. Finally,
Kim II Sung fears that the Soviets might try to establish a
^^^"6 Chinese Dead on Torpedo Boat off South Korea,"
A. P. Wire service Report in the Monterey Peninsula Herald,
24 March 1985, p. 1. -
^^^"South Korea Returns Chinese," A. P. Wire service
Report in the Monterey Peninsula Herald
,
28 March 1985, p.
^^
"Ralph H. Clough, "Recent Trends in the Foreign Policy
of the People's Republic of China," in "National Security
Interests in the Pacific Basin, "ed. Claude A. Buss. Hoover
Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 499. (Xeroxed)
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DPRK government more to their liking, as in Czechoslovakia
and Afghanistan. ^ ^
^
The PRC could have concern about the way the Soviet
Union would react to this ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. As
Jonathan Pollack states:
...no matter how grandiose China's united front rhet-
oric, the Chinese sought to restrain the Soviet exercise
of power, not goad Moscow into preemptive action against
the PRC. Collaborative actions with the West were
intended to complicate Soviet efforts to consolidate
their geopolitical gains in both Southeast and Southwest
Asia, dimmish Soviet pressure against China, and temper
or deter further Soviet actions in areas of insta-
bility. 2''
China does not want to anger the Soviets, anymore than anger
the U.S. The PRC will probably, therefore, neither strongly
condemn ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation, nor affirm or partici-
pate in it. The PRC needs time and technology to eventually
catch up with the superpowers. They hope to get continued
technology support from the West to improve both the mili-
tary and economic aspects of China. They also hope to keep
the Soviets at bay, to buy time for them to reach for super
power status.
3. Republic of China ( ROC )
The cooperation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF
is a complex issue as viewed from the Republic of China
(ROC). It could be evaluated as a positive step to ensure
greater security in East Asia; a step that Taiwan could take
pride in because it confirms what they have been saying:
that Communism is bankrupt. However, neither the Soviet





^Jonathan D. Pollack. "Mainland China's Role in
Pacific Basin Security," in National Security Interests in
the Pacific Basin,' Claude A. Buss, ed . Hoover
Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 429. (Xeroxed)
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Ko states: "She (Taiwan) has no enemies outside the China
mainland. "2 5 7
Taiwan might have one more enemy: time. Since the
U.S.-PRC rapproachment in 1972, ^^^ the clock has been
running down on Taiwan as a separate nation in East Asia.
The ROC government is wise enough to understand this, yet
has firmly rejected all PRC attempts to negotiate Taiwan's
reunification with mainland China.
While the PRC ' s 1981 nine-point reunification
proposal which allows Taiwan to keep its military, economy,
and share in government may look good on paper, the ROC
leadership remembers what happened to Tibet in 1951. That
year Tibet signed an agreement with the PRC to become part
of China. The PRC plan, which guaranteed to honor Tibet's
religion, governmental system and the Dalai Lama, was aban-
doned when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) marched into
Tibet and killed thousands of Tibetans . ^ ^
^
Taiwan doesn't trust the PRC but will not be able to
turn back the clock to pre-normalization days. The notion
that the Republic of China will be able to cooperate as a
full security partner with Japan and the Republic of Korea
forming the "Iron Triangle"^^° is not a viable option today.
Normalization of U.S.-PRC relations has precipitated
ROK-Japan diplomatic movement toward the PRC and away from
Taiwan. However, the Republic of China contributes to the
^^^Tun-Hwa Ko^ "The Interests and Policies of theARepublic of China, in National Security Interests in the
Pacific Basin," ed . Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution,
Stanford, California, 1984, p. 461. (Xeroxed)
2 6 8-
'Yung Wei, 'The Republic of China and the Pacific
Basin: Policy Perspectives in the 1980's," in "National
Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," ed. Claude A.
Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p.
476. (Xeroxed)
2 6 9 Ko, "China," p. 452
^^°A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, The Iron
Triangle
,
(Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press,
Stanford University, 1984.)
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stability of the Far East and desires to continue that
contribution.
To buy as much time as possible, the ROC has gone
into a holding pattern. They would like the U.S. to basi-
cally do these things:
1. Keep the "Taiwan Relations Act" intact.
2. Make no further concession to the PRC ' s demand on
Taiwan.
3. Encourage informal, cooperative studies on such
matters as lines of
.
communication and naval coopera-
tion in the Pacific Basin. ^^^
The U.S. will have difficulty honoring these
requests. The third one, however, does seem to compliment
ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. Wanting to retain good U.S.
relations, Taiwan will probably approve of the cooperation.
The cooperation agreement will not solve its problems
surrounding ROC-PRC reunification, but it could perpetuate
the status quo, and thus, a sovereign ROC.
4. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)
The SRV would probably be concerned about Japan -
ROK naval cooperation. Their most immediate consideration
could be how the Soviets would react to this cooperation
vis-a-vis their naval base at Cam Rahn Bay. It is conceiv-
able that the Soviets could expand the base and/or naval
force levels beyond their current committment of 24 large,
long-range reconnaissance or combat aircraft (TU-16 Badger
and TU-95 Bear), a squadron of MIG-23 Flogger Fighters and
between 25 and 30 ships, including submarines, surface
ships, and auxiliary ships . ^ ^ ^ If this happened, the SRV









on Vietnamese soil would be sympathetic with their national
goals, or in opposition to them.
Naval cooperation between Japan and South Korea
would be viewed by the SRV as a positive step for Washington
and a negative one for Moscow. This fact should disturb the
SRV, particularly if they continue to tie their fortunes so
totally to the Soviet Union. The SRV is almost completely
dependent on the USSR for aid and trade.
The USSR continues to supply Vietnam with all of its
defense needs, in effect underwriting its annual defense
expenditures- -estimated at 50 percent of the total SRV
s-tate budget. It also supplies Vietnam with all of its
petroleum and most of its chemical fertilizer. Moscow
draws from Vietnam as much as it can by way of exports,
but there is little Vietnam has to offer. The result is
one of the worst trade imbalances of any country in the
world. ^ '' ^
The PRC and the SRV are currently involved in a
"cold war" of sorts. The 1979 month- long border war between
the two nations was inconclusive, but did tarnish the
Chinese military reputation.^'" Neither the PRC, nor the
SRV, want a repeat of that incident, though troop redeploy-
ments from the conflict remain essentially intact. ^'^
The PRC considers it knows how to properly handle
the SRV. As Douglas Pike writes:
Chinese leaders believe they know how to deal with
Vietnam and how to influence it, the product of centu-
ries of experience. Further, they believe the U.S. and
others do not know how to handle Vietnam. The Beijing
formula involves sustained unrelieved pressure of any
sort that can be mounted. The Vietnamese understand
only force, say the Chinese, and anything but force is
misread in Hanoi as weakness. A forthcoming gesture or
an offer to compromise differences, the Chinese add.
^'
^Douglas Pike, "The Security Situation in Indochina,'
in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," ed
Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California
1984, p. 317. (Xeroxed).





merely convinces the Hanoi leaders they were right all
along and that they need only to continue their implaca-
bleness to eventually get what they want. There does
seem to be merit in the Chinese policy approach, based
on past history, although it must be noted that three
years of the Chinese method has yielded none of the
results the Chinese desire. ^^^
Because a ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation" agreement
would likely be opposed by the SRV , the PRC might view this
as potential leverage 'against Soviet influence in the SRV.
If the Soviets cannot stop this cooperation between U.S.
allies which strengthens Western security in the Far East,
can they be trusted to continue to fully support the SRV?
While the PRC would not embrace ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation
predominantly because of the DPRK's revulsion to it, the
cooperation could have positive fallout for SRV-PRC
relations.
There is no guarantee, however, that Vietnam will
continue to remain a close military ally with the Soviet
Union. Since World War II, the Vietnamese have had a
history of expelling those who would attempt to influence
them. First the French, then the United States learned that
lesson. Could the Soviets be next? Douglas Pike states it
simply, "The Vietnamese don't like to be dependent on the
USSR, nor do they particularly like the Russians ." ^ ^
^
If, in the years ahead, the Vietnamese gradually
moved away from the Soviets politically, it is difficult to
visualize them as too concerned about a ROK - Japan naval
cooperation agreement. The SRV is already preoccupied with
other issues. Their economy is in shambles, they share a
strategic border with a currently hostile PRC, they are
militarily involved in Kampuchea, and they are nearly
friendless in the world, save Cuba and the USSR.^^^
2'





As long as the SRV and the USSR remain close econom-
ically and militarily, the SRV will be concerned about ROK
Navy - JMSDF cooperation. If the relationship with the
Soviets changes dramatically, so, too, could their opinion
of ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation.
5. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN )
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN),
composed of representatives from Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei, is not
widely recognized for its ability to reach a concensus on
political issues. Yet the basic ideologies of the two
superpowers, the United States and the USSR, is known by
ASEAN, and no one particularly cares for communism. ^ ^ ^ While
the Soviet Union is recognized for its military power, it
presents no attraction to these ASEAN nations as an economic
or social model. The U.S., on the other hand, does.
A ROK Navy - JMSDF agreement of cooperation that
would provide for greater Asian security and please the
U.S., would also, generally speaking, please ASEAN. The
trouble with ASEAN, is that it's virtually impossible to
speak "generally" about any issue concerning it. While
there might be overall approval, individual nations will
have their own opinions
.
Curiously, one of the United States' closest associ-
ates in ASEAN could be the most adamantly opposed to a ROK
Navy - JMSDF cooperation. The Philippines still harbors
deep-seated hatred for Japan, stemming from Japanese treat-
ment of the Filipinos in World War II. The thought of a
remilitarized Japan disgusts them. No Philippine
2 7 8 Ibid.
,
pp. 328-329.
Claude A. Buss, ed. Introductory comments in
'National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin." Hoover
Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 301. (Xeroxed)
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government, Marcos or otherwise, would welcome this
cooperation unless there was direct, and significant
economic benefit for the Philippines in it.
Recognizing this problem. Prime Minister Nakasone
made a tour of five Southeast Asian nations: Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in May, 1983, in
an effort to allay fears of Japan's increased military
expenditures.^^" A masterful diplomat, Nakasone convinced
even President Marcos of the Philippines that Japan is
merely improving its defensive, not offensive capabilities.
Marcos told reporters following the meeting, "I am convinced
he (Nakasone) has no intent of building up a strong military
(for) Japan with capability for attack. "^^^ This incident
demonstrates the persuasive powers of Prime Minister
Nakasone, but it does not clear the way for Philippine
approval of ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation.
Indonesia, too, has unpleasant memories of Japanese
wartime occupation and would likely be concerned about ROK
Navy - JMSDF cooperation. During a 1983 visit to
Washington, President Suharto expressed his concern that the
U.S. was pushing Japan too hard to become a military power.
However, Prime Minister Nakasone worked his magic with
President Suharto during the Japanese leader's ASEAN trip.
Following talks with Nakasone, Suharto said he had no objec-
tions to Japan's current military build-up, "If it is purely
in self-defense . "^ ^ ^ Jakarta might accept a ROK Navy - JMSDF
cooperation plan if it could be sold as "purely
self-defense .
"
^'"Geoffrey Murray, "Japan's Nakasone Mends Fences With
Southeast Asia," Christian Science Monitor
,








Jakarta might also demand more justification for
such cooperation. As the largest Muslim country in the
world, Indonesia is not attracted by godless communism. ^ '
^
However, Indonesia is a leading advocate for the Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) , as a method of mini-
mizing the possibility of superpower confrontation.
Consequently, Indonesia could be wary of any cooperation
based upon military strength to deter the Soviets.
From Indonesia's standpoint, this proposed coopera-
tion between the navies of , the Republic of Korea and Japan
misses the mark for a different reason. Indonesia views not
the USSR as the primary threat, but rather the PRC as its
long-term concern.^''' Unless this cooperation would address
the PRC threat, which it would not, whole-hearted Indonesian
support might be difficult to earn.
Prime Ministers Lee Kuan Yew and Datuk Seri Mahathir
Mohammad, of Singapore and Malaysia, respectively, would
probably be strong supporters of the program. Both these
countries are deeply rooted in British tradition, ^ * ^ and
appreciate a strong counter-balance to the Soviet threat.
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, whose Malaysian "Look East policy
is . . . a personal crusade... to launch the nation from its
embryonic industrialization phase, "^*^ is receptive to
Asians ensuring Asian security. To back this up, he has
increased Malaysian defense expenditures by almost 200
^*^Lie Tek Tj eng , "The Asia-Pacific Power Balance As
Seen From Jakarta: A Projection For the Eighties and
Beyond," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific
Basin, ed. Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford





^Claude A. Buss, Asia in the Modern World. (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1964), p^-721^
^'^Chandran Jeshurun, "The Interests and Policies of
Malaysia: A Study in Historical Change," in "National
Security Interests in the Pacific Basin, ed. Claude A.
Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p.
349. (Xeroxed)
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percent between 1979 and 1982.^^^ A ROK Navy - JMSDF cooper-
ation agreement that assumed more regional security respon-
sibilities would be welcome.
Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew would prob-
ably also embrace ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. He insists
that a united ASEAN front against the Soviet Union and its
Vietnamese satellite is essential to security in Southeast,
and has even proposed joint ASEAN military exercises . ^ ^ ' He
is pro free trade and would likely embrace this cooperation
that supports freedom of the sea-lanes of communication
(SLOG) as a high priority.
Thailand is the country most threatened by Vietnam's
adventurism in Kampuchea. The Thais, however, are savvy at
the game of international relations and usually support the
side that has the most power. ^*^ As Sukhumband Paribatra
says of his countrymen: "When the chips are down, the Thais
love to be standing next to the one with the biggest pile of
chips, "^''' The Thais have no delusions about U.S. resolve,
particularly in light of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. But
pragmatism dictates the Soviets/SRV have nothing to offer
Thailand, while the U.S. still enjoys a booming economy and
an open market for their goods . ^ ^ ^ A cooperation agreement
between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF would probably not
concern Thailand as long as the U.S. keeps the "biggest pile
of chips."
2 8 7 Ibid.
,
p. 356.
^^^Paul Quinn- Judge, "View from Bangkok: Defense and
Economy Are Shared Concerns," Christian Science Monitor, 4
March 1983, pp. 12-13.








The newest ASEAN member is the tiny oil rich Kingdom
of Brunei. Located on the northern coast of Malaysia,
Brunei contributes only 233,000 people^ ^^ to a total popula-
tion of 277 million^ ^^ in ASEAN member nations. Brunei can
be likened more to a Persian Gulf state than a Southeast
Asian country. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah is a* pragmatic
leader, who respects the west and is supportive of U.S.
regional defense plans. ^^"^ He would likely approve of ROK
Navy - JMSDF cooperation, if the United States encouraged
it.
- 6. Australia, New Zealand
,
U.S. (ANZUS)
When ANZUS was established in 1951, this idea of
Republic of Korea - Japan cooperation would have never sold.
The ANZUS Treaty was a U.S. quid pro quo payment to
Australia and New Zealand in return for their agreement to
sign the Japanese peace treaty at the conclusion of World
War II. ^''
Twenty years after World War II, Japan and Australia
h3.ve become economically interdependent to a remarkable
degree. Japan is Australia's largest customer, especially
for raw materials and Australia is an important market for
Japanese manufactured goods. ^^^ Australia-ROK trading volume
can be expected to increase as the ROK economy continues to
expand. ^ ^ ^
^^
^Rodney Tasker, "Our Functioning Power Is Only
Five-and-a-Half , " Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 March
1984, p. 57.
^ ^
^International Institute, Balance, pp. 96-102.
^^
''Tasker, "Functioning Power," p. 57.
^^^J. D. B. Miller, Australia (New York: Walker and
Co., 1966), p. 155.
^^^T. B. Millar, "Australia and the Security of the
Pacific Basin." in "National Security Interests in the
Pacific Basin, Claude A. Buss, ed. Hoover Institution,
Stanford, California, 1984, p. 248. (Xeroxed)
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New Zealand has some of the foodstuffs that Japan
requires and the basis for technical knowledge that both
Japan and the ROK could share in.^^' Both Australia and New
Zealand have vested interests that mitigate in favor of a
ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. In today's world, both coun-
tries recognize the need for others to contribute to the
security of the region. While not as vocal as the United
States on this issue, "Australia has joined in urging Japan
to spend more on defense, including developing a capacity to
patrol sea- lanes . ^ ^
^
New Zealand has fallen on uncomfortable times. With
the ruling Labor government's virtual denial of permission
for U.S. Navy ships to visit her ports, New Zealand has
disappointed the U.S. government and brought world attention
to the anti-nuclear weapon issue. ^°° New Zealand's anti-
nuclear weapons position is not a demand for less security,
but rather a demand for security without nuclear weapons.
New Zealand desires to maintain the ANZUS treaty, and retain
its defensive forces. The problem is New Zealand naively
believes that nuclear weapons can be isolated from its
defense picture. Though maddening to the U.S., it would
have no bearing on New Zealand's decision regarding ROK Navy
- JMSDF cooperation. Neither the ROK Navy, nor the JMSDF
possess or transport nuclear weapons.
^^^Koo Youngnok, "The National Interests and Policies of
the Republic of Korea," in "National Security Interests in
the Pacific Basin," Claude A. Buss, ed. Hoover Institution,
Stanford, California, 1984, p. 138. (Xeroxed)
^ ^
^Henry Albinski, "Australia, New Zealand, and U.S.
Security Interests," m "National Security Interests in the
Pacific Basin," Claude A. Buss, ed . Hoover Institution,
Stanford, California, 1984, pp. 210-211. (Xeroxed)




"Bernard Gwertzman, "New Zealander Wants to Avoid
Fight With U.S.," New York Times, 16 July 1984, p. 1.
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Australia and New Zealand should, therefore, welcome
ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation as an effort to strengthen the
security of the Far East. For them it is an ideal situation
because they enjoy the benefits, but do not have to pay a
penny for the privilege.
7 . South Korea
Due to its unique situation with an unpredictable,
powerful, enemy in the DPRK , the ROK considers national
security as their number. one priority. Koo Youngnok,
distinguished professor and writer, evaluates the ROK's top
six priorities in descending order of importance, as
follows: "national security, economic development, polit-
ical development, national unification, regional interests,
global interests ." ^ ° ^ It is, therefore, reasonable to expect
that the ROK would be in favor of prudent measures to
enhance its national security. ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation
is such a measure.
There are several benefits that the ROK could reap
from naval cooperation with Japan. One is the greater world
recognition and esteem this cooperation would bring to the
ROK. Seoul is conscious of its world image , ^ ° ^ and encour-
ages any endeavor that dissuades those from thinking that
the television program, "M"A"S"H," and the Reverend Moon are
an accurate depiction of the Republic of Korea.
A ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation arrangement would
tend to dispel the mistaken belief that the ROK is merely a
U.S. puppet, ROK association with a generally anti-
militaristic, post World War II Japan could modify Seoul's
police state image, which was regrettably enhanced by the
3 1 Koo Youngnok, "National Interests," p. 134
^ "
^Jacqueline Reditt , "South Korea: President Chun's
3-Year-Old Rule Settles in to a Limited Democracy,"
Christian Science Monitor
,
28 April 1983, p. 12.
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events surrounding the return to South Korea of dissident
Kim Dae Jung.'"' With the advent of the 1988 Olympics in
Seoul, the Republic of Korea would welcome any prudent
measure to demonstrate their legitimacy, magnanimity, and
leadership in the Far East to the world.
The Republic of Korea would also be helping its
closest and most necessary ally, the United States. By
cooperating with the JMSDF, the ROK Navy could encourage the
Japanese to assume more of a vital role in their own defense
and hence the security of the Far East.'"'' Washington would
appreciate this gesture; perhaps even to the point of
offering the Republic of Korea a subsidy or economic aid.
Finally, as already mentioned, this cooperation
would bring with it increased security against DPRK or
Soviet agression without significantly increased defense
expenditures in the Republic of Korea. Even with all these
positive aspects of cooperation, the Republic of Korea would
still have some reservations.
The ROK is dependent on the United States to ensure
its ultimate security. There is a suspicion in Seoul that
the U.S. is looking for a way to pull its troops out of
South Korea, This suspicion is not entirely unfounded. The
Nixon Doctrine and the subsequent 1970 reduction of U.S.
forces by one Army division, the crisis of confidence that
centered around the United States defeat in Vietnam, and the
I
977 Carter plan for a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops,'"^
all point to a perceived U.S. desire to leave South Korea as
soon as possible. If the ROK believed that its cooperation
with Japan, would offer the U.S. an excuse to again propose
""Mark Whitaker, "A Test of Wills in South Korea,"
Newsweek
,
18 February 1985, pp. 36-37.
'""Edward A. Olsen, "Why Not Let South Korea Help?
Christian Science Monitor
,
2 June 1983, p. 23.
'"'Koo, "Republic of Korea," p. 136.
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the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, that
cooperation would probably not happen.
Academician HanSung-Joo raised concern over United
States encouragement for Japan's spending more on its
defense
:
But the most serious security threat to other Asian
countries resulting from an accelerated Japanese mili-
tary buildup will "arise from the possibility that,
either out or confidence in Japanese military capability
or friction with rearmed Japan, the United States may
choose to reduce or end its military presence in the
area.^°^
If naval cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan
is perceived as a Japanese military buildup, then South
Korea would probably not agree to cooperate.
These concerns are real and won't evaporate. The
U.S. will have to ensure that the Republic of Korea believes
this cooperation will not be an excuse for a U.S. troop
withdrawal from the ROK, and convince them that Japan is not
rearming to dominate East Asia. If this can be done, the
the ROK has substantial justification to endorse this ROK
Navy - JMSDF cooperation plan.
8 . Japan
japan is the key to the success or failure of this
proposed naval cooperation. It is at the center of several
difficult issues that directly impact upon the potential for
cooperation between the ROK, JMSDF, and the U.S. Navy. One
of the most critical between the U.S. and Japan, and there-
fore the entire cooperation issue, is the question of burden
sharing. The problem with the MSDF is quite simple. It is
too small to do its job, so the United States does it for
^"^Han Sung-Joo, "The Republic of Korea and the Major
Powers." in "National Security Interests in the Pacific
Basin, ed. Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford,
California, 1984, p. 170. (Xeroxed)
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Japan. It simply does not have enough ships and men to
protect its coastline, let alone patrol 1000 nautical miles
from it, as Prime Ministers Suzuki and Nakasone agreed to
support . ^ ° ^ Clearly, the Japanese need to allocate more
money to the proper areas of defense. With the second
largest GNP in the world, a population of over
120,800,000,^°' and a country virtually dependent upon over-
seas trade, a Navy of 54 major combatants ^ ° ^ is a less than
serious attempt at self-defense.
How can the United States encourage the Japanese to
do more? Does the U.S. have to renegotiate a new U.S. -Japan
Mutual Security Treaty
,
before Japan will consent to invest
more in its defense? While the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security
Treaty has heretofore been an excuse for Japan to spend
little on defense, ^^° I do not believe it is in the best
interest of the United States or future ROK - Japan naval
cooperation to abrogate that treaty in the hope of renegoti-
ating a better one.
This issue has been unsuccessfully addressed by two
1981 U.S. Congressional proposals. The first, by Senator
Jesse Helms (R. , N.C.), proposed an amendment to renegotiate
the U.S. -Japan security treaty making it a reciprocal
arrangement. A second, by Stephen Neal (D., N.C.), proposed
Japan pay a two percent "security tax" to the U.S. to share
in the Far East security burden. The U.S. Senate tabled
Senator Helms' proposal. Congressman Neal's was denounced
by a Japanese editorial in Asahi Evening News, which claimed
^°
^Bouchard and Hess, "Sea Lanes Defense," p. 90.







"Geoffrey Murray, "Rearming Japan: Nakasone 's
Policies Renew Old Debate," Christian Science Monitor, 4
April 1983, p. 12.
104
that the Congressman didn't understand the Japan-U.S.
security treaty at all.^^^
If the U.S. gave notice to cancel the Treaty to
renegotiate a new treaty, three things could happen, and two
of them would be bad. Japan could fail to negotiate a new
treaty; could negotiate a poorer treaty; or could negotiate
a better treaty. In other words, the chance that a better
treaty would emerge is one out of three. For example,
treaty abrogation could tempt Japan to go a Gaullist inde-
pendent, a pacifistic, or a militaristic route. They might
believe that the United States would protect them even
without any Treaty, which is probably true, and therefore
see no reason to negotiate a new one.
A further problem is the fluctuating U.S. domestic
political climate and the difficulty of sticking tough to an
issue that could take several years to resolve. Americans
want fast, victorious wars; fast negotiations; fast foods
and fast solutions to vast problems. A patient Japanese
approach to developing a mutual defense treaty could result
in a poorer treaty arrangement for an impatient United
States. If our impatience prevented the U.S. from getting
the kind of treaty we need, then we deserve what we get.
These potential pitfalls of major treaty renegotia-
tion merely point out that while the benefits could indeed
be significant, the chance of failure is manifold. Our
current inadequate treaty is better than a poor one, which
is better than no treaty at all.
From Japan's perspective, the U.S. has been brow-
beating them since the late 1960's, trying to get them to
spend more money on defense. The Japanese know they've got
a good deal in the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty, yet
^ ^
^ Edward A. Olsen, US- Japan Strategic Reciprocity : A
Neo- Internationalist View ( Stanf ordr; California : Hoover
Institution Press, Stanford University, 1985), p. 27.
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they have contributed something to the military security
omelet. In their minds, they haven't gotten a "free ride,"
yet the U.S. never thanks them for their contribution, but
instead, always demands more.^^^
A partial solution to these troubling issues would
be the cooperation of JMSDF and ROK navies. This coopera-
tion would please the U.S., cost no party a great deal more
money, probably less for the U.S., and perhaps quiet strong
U.S. criticism of Japan's low defense spending.
A second issue is. the question of modifying the
Japanese Constitution in order to permit ROK - Japan - U.S.
naval cooperation. Modifying the Constitution is a
Pandora's Box that Japanese officials have heretofore
avoided like the plague. However, they have still managed
to do exactly what they have wanted to with the Japanese
Self -Defense Forces, while the Constitution was firmly in
place
.
If Japan decides that the ROK Navy and JMSDF cooper-
ation is appropriate, the Constitution can be amended.
Hdwever, that will probably not be necessary. For example,
the Japanese already participate in Rim of the Pacific
(RIMPAC) exercises with Australia, New Zealand, Canada and
the United States, and have done so since 1980.^^^ If this
participation in an exercise that spans the entire Pacific
Ocean can be accepted as a legitimate self-defense effort
within the context of the Constitution, then a ROK Navy -
JMSDF cooperation effort should be constitutionally
acceptable
.
A third problem area that should be carefully worked
out is the question of Japanese public opinion. This is








Without it, this proposal has no chance. This issue is
particularly acute in Japan where the memories of World War
II are of hunger, death and dishonor . ^ ^ "*
The anti-war attitude is strong in Japan and
supports a national bent toward pacifism. Only 20.6 per
cent of those Japanese polled in a 1983 survey said they
would defend Japan if it was invaded by a foreign power. ^^^
Getting this Japanese public to agree to cooperation with
the Republic of Korea on defense issues could be quite a
challenge.
How, then, can Japanese public opinion change enough
to permit cooperation? To begin, if any one person can
effectively alter public opinion in this issue, Prime
Minister Nakasone can. Unlike most of his predecessors,
Nakasone is a dynamic leader with a great faculty for commu-
nication. Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew agreed
when he complimented Nakasone on being so different from
previous Japanese P. M.'s who used, "soft and misty
language ." ^ ^ ^ Nakasone 's communicating skill was again
demonstrated when he convincingly appeared on Japanese tele-
vision with an unprecedented plea to "buy more foreign
goods ." ^ ^ ' If Prime Minister Nakasone fully supported and
backed this cooperation proposal, public opinion could grad-
ually change. While Nakasone can not retain his current
^^
"Clyde Haberman, "Japanese Celebrate, Sort of, a
Patriotic Day Today," New York Times
,
11 February 1984, p.
^^
^Geoffrey Murray, "Pacifism Reigns in Japan as US
Pushes It to Rearm," Christian Science Monitor, 23 March
1983, p.l.
^^
^Geoffrey Murray, "Japan's Nakasone Mends Fences With
Southeast Asia," Christian Science Monitor, ll May 1983, p.
13.
^^
'Charles P. Alexander, "Buy More Foreign Goods," Time
Magazine
, 22 April 1985, pp. 42-43.
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position for a third term, he almost certainly will remain
very influential for many years in an "elder statesman"
role
.
Another factor is an apparent easing of anti-war
sentiment in Japan. Two examples illustrate this point.
First, is the success Japan has enjoyed with 'the RIMPAC
exercises . ^ ^ * As few as ten years ago, Japanese public
opinion would have prevented JMSDF participation in this
joint U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia exercise. Today,
JMSDF participation is generally accepted by the Japanese
public. '^'
A second example is the lack of political protest
connected with the March, 1983, Japanese port visit of the
U.S. Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise.
The last port visit of the Enterprise to Japan, in 1968, was
punctuated with violent demonstrations, which resulted in
the injury of 600 people. ^^° This latest visit was peaceful
in comparison, with a few thousand demonstrators, some small
boats in the harbor, and no reported injuries. ^^^ With time,
the Japanese people can moderate even deeply-held beliefs,
such as is the anti-nuclear position.
Japanese public opinion might be encouraged to move
in a direction favorable to ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation.
However, this will not happen overnight. With the proper
encouragement from government officials over time, the
Japanese could eventually support this cooperation as a
necessary step to ensure Japan's defense. This will not be
easy, but it is possible.
3 1 8 Japan Defense Agency, Defense
,
p. 179
^^^Frank Cranston, "Japanese To Play Bigger RIMPAC
Role," Jane ' s Defense Weekly
,
18 February 1984, p. 226.
^^
"Geoffrey Murray, "USS Enterprise Visit to Japan:
Less Turmoil Than in 1968," Christian Science Monitor, 23






Japan knows the Soviet military presence in the Pacific
is real. While they consider the threat to their security
to be economic, they are not blind to Soviet military power.
The Japanese also know that the Soviets aspire to somehow
gain control of, or neutralize, their island nation if for
no other reason than to tilt the East-West balance in the
Pacific in their favor. ^^^
Since World War II, Japan has enjoyed the protection of
the United States at minimal cost. Pacifism has developed
and flourished as a viable national response to foreign
threat . ^ ^ ^ The shooting down of South Korea's Flight 007, in
which 28 innocent Japanese people were killed, ^^^ makes it
more difficult to justify pacifism as a response to the
Soviet Union. While they do not acknowledge a true Soviet
"threat," the Japanese concede the "threat potential" of the
USSR. That is enough.
To partially counter that potential threat, and to
placate U.S., the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has
increased in size slightly, but increased its capability and
sophistication significantly. Today's MSDF is a profes-
sional group, whose shipboard cleanliness and smart military
appearance during exercises have impressed observers . -^ ^ ^
They seem somehow to be positively motivated to do a job on
which many in Japan frown.
^^
^Geoffrey Murray, "Tokyo Worries Soviet SS-20's May
Swing West," Christian Science Monitor
,
2l January 1983, p.
^^
^Geoffrey Murray, "Pacifism Reigns" p. 1,




^Bouchard and Hess, "Sea Lanes Defense," p. 94.
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The problem is Japan's inability to recognize that it is
no longer the "poor little island country" it once was.
With the world's second largest GNP , next to the mighty
U.S.,^^^ Japan is far from poor. Japan must see that it has
legitimate defense responsibilities in the region, that they
are not currently supporting. Only if they feel obligated
will they help. If they are merely encouraged to spend more
money, they will grudgingly spend a bit more.
The Republic of Korea, on the other hand, clearly sees
the DPRK as the major threat . ^ ^ "^ The DPRK enjoys superior
numbers of Naval platforms. However, unlike the North
Korean Air Force, where larger numbers of older aircraft
meant little when faced with more effective ROK Air Force
aircraft, the sheer number of North Korean vessels must be
viewed with concern by the South. The North has little or
no long-range naval power projection capability, yet it has
an effective coastal surveillance and defense Navy . ^ ^ ' While
the ROK Navy has larger ships, and a more sophisticated
surface-to-surface antishipping missile in the Harpoon, the
North has many more missiles, torpedoes and guns to
neutralize the South' s qualitative advantage . ^ ^ ^ The South
is the more professional of the two in antisubmarine warfare
and antiair warfare, yet neither North nor South could match
the U.S., USSR, or the UK in these important areas . ^ ^
"
Most scenarios of a Northern invasion of South Korea
find the Navy playing only a limited role, including anti-
shipping operations, special forces insertion, naval gunfire

















partial Northern goals, there is ample evidence that the
North's superior numbers could overcome the South' s qualita-
tive advantage and thus achieve its goals.
It seems, then, that a panacea for both the Republic of
Korea and Japan could be naval cooperation. With the
sophistication level of the two naval forces today, their
positive motivation, and their professionalism, the JMSDF
and the ROK Navy could become a major element in our Pacific
defense policy by the year 2000. That will happen, however,
only if these countries
.
can overcome their historical
animosity and join with the U.S. Navy in a cooperative pact.
It is conceivable that South Korea's efforts to improve
overall Asian security in the face of the Soviet threat
could engender stronger U.S. -ROK defense ties. As discussed
in Chapter VII, the ROK fears the U.S. is looking for an
excuse to pull American troops out of South Korea. If by
cooperating with the JMSDF, the ROK Navy assumed more of the
overall Far East security burden, America would have diffi-
culty defending a pull out of U.S. troops. South Korea's
support at sea could be reciprocated with continued U.S.
support on the Korean peninsula, thus both would benefit.
Additionally, the U.S. could use ROK Navy participation
in Far East security as an incentive to encourage Japan to
contribute more. Edward Olsen explores this potential when
he says
:
...it is unlikely that Japan could tolerate passively
the humiliation of another Asian country doing Japan's
duty- -particularly if it is South Korea. Having
Americans do Japan's job may seem wise and crafty to
Tokyo, but being shown up by Koreans would be galling to
the Japanese sense of pride and honor.
The peer pressure resulting from such a loss of face,
probably exacerbated by Koreans ' willingness to play
their role to the hilt, could well stir Japan to meet
its responsibilities to help the US bear the burden for
regional security. . . . ^ ^ ^
^'







The worst that could happen is that Japan could ignore the
subtleties of the situation and not contribute more to the
security equation. This would leave the U.S. no worse off
than today. However, Japan might be encouraged to do more,
a situation favorable to the United States.
The U.S. must take the lead in this endeavor, and
therein lies the challenge. It will be difficult to estab-
lish ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation, but not impossible.
There are some advantages that should help. First, both the
Republic of Korea and Japan would benefit from it. Japan
would gain an ally, the security of more ships, and would
placate the United States, partially diffusing the demand
for more Japanese military spending. The ROK would gain
prestige, validity, and bring more power to bear against its
true enemy, the DPRK.
Second, while gaining added security, this cooperation
plan is not costly. The emphasis and strength of this plan
should be "come as you are" cooperation. Perhaps a slogan,
"Come as you are, return with lots more," would be appro-
priate to help sell the cooperation idea. Everyone appreci-
ates a "bargain," and ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation is an
excellent one.
Another benefit of cooperation, is continued improvement
in ROK - Japan relations. Much has been accomplished in the
last decade to improve relations, including exchange visits
by heads of state, ^^^ resolution of the ROK financial "aid"
issue, ^^^ and a satisfactory conclusion to the Japanese
school books issue. '^'* Perhaps the Japanese Emperor's
^^^Clyde Haberman, "Hirohito Soothes Korean President,"
New York Times
,
7 September 1984, p. 1.
^^^"Japan Government Plans to Grant Aid to South
Koreans," Wall Street Journal, 13 January 1983, p. 34.
^^'*Geoffrey Murray, "Japan's Junior High Schoolers Learn
heir Nation's Militarism," Christian Science(Again) of T
Monitor
,
7 June 1983, p. 9
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comments to visiting President Chun Doo Hwan are even more
significant . ^ ^ ^ Friendship and cooperation on any level
between the ROK and Japan is important to both countries. A
cooperation agreement between Navies would be particularly
beneficial and the easiest of all forms of military
cooperation.
The navy is the best branch of service to institute
military cooperation between the two countries. The navy is
best because it is less visible that the army, air force or
marines. Ships operating, at sea, miles from view, are
easier to accept than a Japanese infantry division exer-
cising in South Korea, or a squadron of ROK F-5 fighter-
bombers flying out of Japanese bases. If joint port calls
are arranged, they can be orchestrated for two to three days
to promote goodwill and brotherhood. A short three-day port
visit is infinitely easier to control than a two week
in-country exercise.
Finally, naval cooperation is best because cooperation
actually ensures greater security, dispelling cooperation-
f6r-cooperation' s-sake criticism. Through joint U.S. - ROK
- Japan exercises, readiness and training of all could be
improved. Any increase in readiness improves security. The
ROK and Japan would be better prepared to face foreign mili-
tary adventurism if it challenged their respective nations.
Why, then, will ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation be diffi-
cult? There are a myriad of reasons why this cooperation
could never be attained. The current trend toward ROK -
Japan reconciliation could shift dramatically from an unfor-
seen controversy or crisis, fishing dispute, trade war, or
change in leadership in Seoul and Tokyo. Barring these
events which may or may not occur, there are still many
current issues that could prevent cooperation.
^ ^ ^
"Emperor ' s Remarks to Chun on Korea Ties," New York
Times
,
7 September 1984, p. A9
.
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One such issue is Japan's desire to open trade and
cultural exchange with the DPRK. Tokyo has made, and
continues, overtures to Pyongyang to avoid the complete
isolation of North Korea from the rest of the non-communist
world. ^^® Although South Korea deprecates these attempts at
diplomacy, there is some understanding in Seoul "about what
Japan is attempting to do. ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation
would be violently denounced by Pyongyang and could likely
destroy Japanese efforts to maintain a dialogue with it.
This is perhaps the problem that might ultimately
prevent ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. Seoul and Pyongyang
so despise each other that any move to improve security is
viewed by the other as an act of aggression. A possible
solution is to exempt the Japanese from participation in the
ROK Navy's anti-DPRK infiltration work, restricting ROK Navy
- JMSDF cooperation to the "high seas" only, and designate
the DPRK seaborne infiltration problem as either a coastal
or Coast Guard- type issue. While this would limit the scope
of ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation, it might be the only way
for the Japanese to embrace the idea. •
Another problem is allocation of military units in time
of conflict. Put another way, who protects whom in time of
war? This problem was experienced in World War II between
the European and Pacific theatres and is certainly not
exclusively an issue with ROK - JMSDF cooperation.^^'' It
remains a difficult issue to resolve and must be handled on
a case-by-case basis. A method of resolving this issue
would be to let the overall warfare Commander, in this case
Commander U.S. Seventh Fleet, make the warfare commander's
^^
^Geoffrey Murray, "Japan Tiptoes Cautiously Toward
Better Relations With North Korea," Christian Science
Monitor, 29 July 1983, p. 8
^^^E. B. Potter, ed
.
, Sea Power: A Naval History
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall" r9'60 ) , pT
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final decision on where units would be assigned. This would
alleviate the possibility of ROK - Japan confrontation over
the issue and would assign the U.S. a position of great
responsibility.
The United States stands to gain significantly from ROK
Navy - JMSDF cooperation for the security of East Asia. The
U.S. would directly benefit by reducing its support in
defense of the Sea of Japan. This would free some U.S.
Naval assets for other uses, and give it better ship deploy-
ment cycles. The exercises between ROK - U.S. - Japan
navies would raise the readiness level of all and prepare
those navies for an effective, quick response in crises.
Port visits, exchange officer programs, schooling opportuni-
ties and operational conferences would draw the three
services closer together in a bond of mutual security.
Civil relationships could also improve along the way.
Cooperation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF is
possible, likely and desirable. Since, on balance, all of
the countries involved would benefit from this cooperation,
the U.S. should strongly encourage it. Early low-key
officer exchange programs, conferences, and war games could
be the start. Small three-ship exercises could be scheduled
with more complicated, sophisticated ones to follow.
Carefully orchestrated, the ROK Navy and JMSDF could ease
into cooperation without fanfare.
In the absence of cooperation, the United States will
continue spending huge sums on the defense of the Far East
.
That defense will be excellent but will include only piece-
meal support from Japan and South Korea. With cooperation,
the United States will also spend huge sums of money on the
defense of the Far East, but will have two partners to share
that responsibility. The former is a responsibility to
bear, the latter a partnership to cherish.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF FORCES OF THE U.S. (FAR EAST)
Naval Forces
Personnel: Navy - 180,000 (Includes Naval Aviation and
Shore Support)
Marine - 79,000 (Two Divisions)
Submarines: SSBN - 2
SSN - 38
SS - 2 .










ASW Patrol Aircraft: 250
Air Forces
Personnel (USAF): 45,000
Aircraft: Fighter/Attack (USAF) - 279
(USN/tJSMC) - 711
Bombers (SAC- TAG) - 12
ASW Patrol - 250
Ground Forces





SUMMARY OF FORCES OF NORTH KOREA
Naval Forces
Personnel: 30,500 (plus 40,000 Reserves)
Submarines: SS - 21
Principal Surface Combatants: Corvettes - 4
Patrol Combatants: PTG - 24
Coastal Patrol-River/Roadstand Craft
'(Includes Missile and Torpedo Attack Boats): 400
Air Forces
Personnel: 51,000
Aircraft: Bombers - 70 (light)
Ground Attack Fighters - 390
Fighters - 260
Ground Forces :
Personnel: 700,000 (plus 230,000 Reserves)
Forces: Armored Divisions - 2
Motorized Infantry Divisions - 3
Infantry Divisions - 34
Armored Brigades - 5
Infantry Brigades - 9
Equipment: Tanks: - 2,825
Artillery - 3,300 (76mm and above)
Special Forces: 100,000
Paramilitary Forces
Militia and Security Forces: 4,000,000
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APPENDIX C
SUMMARY OF FORCES OF THE USSR (FAR EAST)
Naval Forces
Personnel: 134,000 (Includes Naval Aviation, Coastal
Defense, Naval Information, and
Shore Support)
Submarines: SSBN - 31
Others - 102










Tincludes 30 Backfires) - 120
Tactical Support - 80




Aircraft: Bomber/Strike (Includes 40 Backfires) - 200




Forces: Motorized Rifle/Armored Divisions - 52
Equipment: Tanks: - 13,000
Artillery - 6,500 (122mm and greater)
Strategic Forces : SS-20 - 135
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APPENDIX p
SUMMARY OF FORCES OF SOUTH KOREA
Naval Forces
Personnel: 49,000 (includes 20,000 Marines; plu:
60,000 Reserves)
Principal Surface Combatants: DD - 11
FF - 8
Corvette - 3
Coastal Patrol Craft: 18
'Landing Ships: 33
ASW Aircraft: Fixed Wing - 32
Helicopter - 12
Air Forces
Personnel: 33,000 (plus 55,000 Reserves)
Aircraft: Ground Attack Fighters - 354
Fighters - 72
Ground Forces
Personnel: 540,000 (plus 1,400,000 Regular Army Reserves)
Forces: Mechanized Infantry Divisions - 2
Infantry Divisions - 20
Independent Brigades - 11
Equipment: Tanks - 1,200
Artillery - 2,500 (105mm and above)
Paramilitary Forces
Civilian Defense Corps: 4,400,000
Student Homeland Defense Corps: 1,820,000
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APPENDIX E
SUMMARY OF FORCES OF JAPAN
Naval Forces
Personnel: 44,000 (includes 11,000 Naval Air;
plus 600 Reserves)
Submarines: SS - 14





Patrol Combatants: PGF - 18
Naval Aircraft: Combat Aircraft (MPA) - 81
Combat Helicopters - 63
Air Forces
Personnel: 46,000
Aircraft: Ground Attack Fighters - 50
Fighters - 200
Ground Forces
Personnel: 155,000 (plus 41,000 Reserves)
- Forces: Armored Division - 1
Infantry Divisions - 12 (7,000 or 9,000 men each)
Composite Brigades - 2
Airborne Brigade - 1
Artillery Brigade - 1
Equipment: Tanks - 900
Artillery - 440 (150mm and above)
Paramilitary Forces :
Coast Guard: Large Patrol Ships - 42
Small/Medium Coastal Patrol Craft - 286
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